Librosdelacorte.es
PRIMAVERA-VERANO
nº 26, AÑO 15 (2023)
ISSN 1989-6425

OTTOMAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE DEFEAT AT LEPANTO (1571)[1]

İdris Bostan
(İstanbul University)
idbos@istanbul.edu.tr

ABSTRACT

The defeat at Lepanto deeply affected the Ottoman administration and society, particularly the Sultan. The cost of the defeat, with the loss of both ships and trained manpower, was substantial. As an empire accustomed to victories, the Ottomans, although severely affected by this defeat, tried to portray it as a natural outcome both in domestic and foreign circles. While they accepted it with reliance on Allah as the "will of the creator", they took the necessary measures and quickly built a brand-new navy. In order to understand how the defeat and its reasons were perceived by Sultan Selim II, Vizier Sokullu Mehmed Pasha, Şeyhülislâm Ebussuud Efendi, and other senior administrators, as well as to determine public resonances, it is necessary to closely examine the Imperial Council decisions and the statements of the chroniclers, who witnessed the impact of the defeat at Lepanto and described it in their works comprehensively.

KEYWORDS: Lepanto; Ottoman Navy; Selim II; Ebussuûd Efendi; Fatwa.

LA ACTITUD OTOMANA ANTE LA DERROTA DE LEPANTO (1571)

RESUMEN

Las consecuencias de la derrota de Lepanto afectaron profundamente la administración y la sociedad otomanas, sobre todo al sultán. El coste de esta derrota marítima para el estado y la sociedad fue sustancial en términos de la pérdida de la mano de obra cualificada, así como la pérdida de barcos. Como un imperio acostumbrado a las victorias, los otomanos intentaron presentar lo ocurrido en Lepanto como un desenlace natural, tanto por dentro como por fuera, a pesar de que se vieron gravemente afectados por la derrota sufrida. Sin embargo, a pesar de que aceptaron la derrota con una cierta resignación como “el acto de Dios”, esto no les impidió actuar con extrema rápidez para tomar las medidas necesarias y empezar a reconstruir la armada imperial. Para comprender como se percibió la derrota por el

[1] Translated by Ahmet Tekin PhD Candidate at İstanbul University, Türkiye.

sultán Selim II, el visir Sokullu Mehmed Pasha, el *Şeyhülislam* Ebussuûd Efendi y otros dirigentes otomanos de alto nivel, así como para saber la opinión pública sobre la derrota, es necesario examinar detenidamente las decisiones tomadas en el *Divan-ı Hümayun* (consejo imperial) y las afirmaciones de los historiadores otomanos de la época. Contrariamente a la creencia general, los historiadores otomanos contemporáneos, como testigos de los acontecimientos, observaron personalmente el impacto de la derrota en Lepanto y lo describieron de manera exhaustiva en sus obras.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Lepanto, Armada Otomana, Selim II, Ebussuûd Efendi, Fatwa

***

INTRODUCTION

The Battle of İnebahtı/Lepanto, known as the *Sıngın* naval war[2] in Ottoman sources, is accepted as the first major naval battle in Ottoman naval history that resulted in a defeat and loss of the navy. In other words, the sea battle was by far the most distinguished naval incident the Ottomans faced in terms of the consequences it triggered in its aftermath. The combat took place near the island of Beydemir (Oxia) off the Inebahtı Bay between the Allied Crusader and the Ottoman fleets (October 7, 1571). It appears that the name Beydemir was unknown to the Ottomans and was not mentioned in their sources[3]. On the other hand, the European sources, particularly those of Spanish origin, seem to refer to the battle as Lepanto from the beginning[4]. However, the word Lepanto was not mentioned in early Venetian sources, being preceded by *Ekinadi* or *Curzolari* in the description of the battle[5].

Following the Battle of Preveza (1538), Ottoman expansion into the western parts of the Mediterranean eventually gave way to an "Ottoman Mediterranean". The Ottoman Empire, which established itself in North Africa by conquering Tripolitania in 1551 from the Spanish kingdom and further consolidated its position in the Mediterranean with the Battle of Djerba in 1560, vigorously implemented its central and western Mediterranean policies during the times of Barbarossa Hayreddin Pasha, Turgut Pasha, Piyale Pasha, and Uluç/Kılıç Ali Pasha. Although the Siege of Malta

[2] İstanbul Üniversitesi, Nadir Eserler Kütüphanesi, TY. 5959: Gelibolulu Mustafa Âlî, *Künhü'l-ahbâr*, 458v-459r; Kâtib Çelebi, *Tuhfetü'l-Kibâr fî Esfâri'l-Bihâr* (Ankara: TÜBA, 2018), 71, 172; Naîmâ Mustafa Efendi, *Târih-i Na'îmâ*, edited by Mehmet İpşirli, (Ankara: TTK, 2007), IV, 1679. In Turkish, the word "sıngın" means "sınmak", meaning defeated (*Yeni Tarama Sözlüğü*, Ankara 1983, 186).

[3] Beydemir was mentioned only in a register kept for the Lepanto expedition. BOA (the Ottoman Archives within the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye Directorate of State Archives), Kamil Kepeci (KK) Classification, 223, 4-5.

[4] On the use of the name Lepanto Naval Battle in early Spanish sources for Inebahtı, see Fernando de Herrera, *Relacion de la guerra de Cipre, y sucesso de la batalla Naval de Lepanto* (Sevilla, 1572). I would like to thank my esteemed colleague Dr. Evrim Türkçelik for informing me about this source.

[5] The name of the battle is mentioned in Venetian sources as «La Battaglia di Echinadi» or «La Battaglia di Curzolari». Similar to how the Ottomans described «Beydemir Island», the Venetians described the battle using the name of the island.

(1565) was a failure for the Ottomans, it posed a significant threat to Spanish dominions in the Mediterranean. Since the Ottomans dominantly thought that only a reorganized navy could conquer Malta, their attention moved to another strategically more urgent and significant objective in the Mediterranean, namely Cyprus.

The Ottoman expedition to Cyprus required the building of three new navies, each greater than the previous one. The Cyprus expedition in 1570-71, the Lepanto campaign in 1571, and the naval expeditions in 1572 to secure the Ottoman standing in the Mediterranean, all required extensive organizations. Despite the fact that the conquest of Cyprus culminated in success, the news of defeat at the Battle of Lepanto elicited a strong reaction in the Ottoman capital.

NAVIES BEFORE THE BATTLE

On May 4, 1571, the Ottoman navy embarked from Istanbul with a fleet of 124 galleys under the command of Pertev Pasha. Hayreddin Pashazade Hasan Pasha sailed out with the remaining 100 galleys about a month later. The chief admiral Müezzinzâde Ali Pasha, who left Istanbul on March 16, to take reinforcements and ammunition to Cyprus, returned with 80 ships, thus, the total number of ships in the three navies reached 300, and they set sail from Evvoia to Crete for Lepanto[6]. Braudel also confirms that the Ottoman navy, consisting of 200 galleys and 100 *galliot*s sailed from Evvoia to Crete[7].

The Ottoman attack on the island of Crete was ensued by a series of incursions on the Venetian isles and coasts all the way to the Adriatic, and the fleet returned from Nova and arrived in Lepanto on September 22[8]. The Allied fleet was approaching as the Ottoman force dropped anchor in the Gulf of Lepanto.

The Spanish fleet, led by Don Juan, arrived in Mesina on August 24, while the Venetian fleet, led by Agostino Barbarigo and Marco Quirini and based in Crete, arrived in the final days of the month. The Allied fleet arrived in Corfu on September 27, unsure about the actions to be taken. Don Juan, the Spanish fleet commander, insisted on heading directly to either Cyprus or Tunisia, whilst Sebastiano Veniero, his Venetian counterpart, insisted on a direct assault on the Ottoman fleet. Finally, with the support of the Papal Fleet Commander Colonna, the decision was made to

[6] On the number of ships in the navy, see İdris Bostan, "La Armada Otomana: De la Conquista de Chipre a la Batalla de Lepanto," in *La Mar Roja de Sangre, Lepanto*, ed. Àlex Claramunt Soto (Madrid: Desperta Ferro 2021), 146-148.

[7] Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), II, 1099. Braudel writes, without specifying the date, that 196 galleys sailed from Istanbul, split in two at Evvoia, the major supply base, and one group went to Cyprus. However, the fleet of Müezzinzâde that went to Cyprus had already left Istanbul on March 16.

[8] On the course of operations of the Ottoman fleet from Evvoia to Crete and its activities on the route until it anchored in Lepanto, see Bostan, "La Armada Otomana," 150-155.

attack the Ottoman fleet. The allied fleet waited on the island of Cephalonia on October 5-6 to restock the ships[9].

The information on the number of ships on both sides differs significantly. After a five or six-month-long naval operation, a number of *levent*[10] ships and some *sancak*[11] governors, who served in the vicinity of Lepanto, asked permission to leave the navy. The Ottoman Navy thus fell short in the number of ships, oarsmen, and combatants. According to Ottoman sources, the Ottoman fleet at the time of the battle had approximately 250 ships and 25.000-30.000 fighters. The Allies had about 230 ships and 40.000-50.000 fighters. Although the Allied galleys were largely armed with cannon and flintlock muskets; artillery and handguns were also in use in Ottoman galleys, but the warfare was mostly conducted with the bow-and-arrow[12]. The Venetian naval barges, capable of firing ten cannons from four sides, were used for the first time in this war. The fundamental difference between the two navies was that the Ottoman navy had been weakened by long and exhausting conflicts of the earlier months, whilst the Allied fleet was fresh and vigorous for a full scale clash.

THE DAY OF THE BATTLE

On October 7, 1571, the two navies met. The Ottoman navy sailed out from the Lepanto Strait and headed to the place of battle. After the Allied navy arrived in Gulf of Patras in the early hours of the morning, the fleets started to take battle order. Both navies were divided into three sections: a center, two wings, and a reserve squadron. As commander-in-chief of the Allied navy, Don Juan, controlled the center, Gian Andrea Doria commanded the right wing, Agostino Barbarigo commanded the left wing, and Don Alvaro de Bazan commanded the reserve force. The Venetians were mainly on the left wing[13]. The Ottoman fleet was commanded by Müezzinzâde Ali Pasha in the center, with the right wing led by the Beg of Alexandria Şolok Mehmed Bey, the left wing led by Uluç Ali Pasha, and the ships of Pertev Pasha serving as a reserve force. After the fleets took their positions, the coastal fleets advanced first at midday. Ottoman galleys, in face of the frontal attack of the Venetian barges, broke the line they had previously formed to let the barges pass, but while the giant Venetian vessels moved through, they fired their side guns which effectively battered Ottoman war galleys. Şolok Mehmed Bey closed on the left of

[9] Ibidem, 155-156; Braudel, *The Mediterranean,* II, 1099-1101; John F. Guilmartin, *Galleons and Galleys* (London: Cassell & Co., 2002), 141.

[10] A phrase used in the Ottoman Empire to describe naval soldiers and men who accompanied provincial governors. Mücteba İlgürel, "Levent," *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi* 27 (2003): 149-151.

[11] The term literally means "Banner", also known as *liva,* the basic military-administrative unit of the Ottoman Empire. A *sancak* consisted of 200 to 1000 settlements under the command of the *sancak begis.* Gustav Bayerle, *Pashas, Begs, and Effendis: A Historical Dictionary of Titles and Terms in the Ottoman Empire* (İstanbul: The Isis Press, 1997), 131.

[12] Bostan, "La Armada Otomana," 156. Braudel states that there were 208 warships and six galleasses in the allied fleet. Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, II, 1102.

[13] Guilmartin, *Galleons and Galleys*, 140-141.

Agostino Barbarigo, the deputy commander of the Venetian navy, and tried to lure him into shallow waters.

In the early phase of the battle, Müezzinzâde Ali Pasha, the chief admiral, launched an attack with his *bastarda*. The three lanterns of his admiral ship was recognized by enemy captains who converged on the Ottoman vessel, and two Venetian barzas intercepted and opened gunfire on the *bastarda*. During the clashes, Müezzinzâde Ali Pasha was killed by a musket shot. The *bastarda* of commander-in-chief Pertev Pasha was also destroyed by cannon fire. Mahmud Bey, the son of Hayreddin Paşazâde Hasan Pasha, rescued the commander-in-chief who, losing his vessel, was struggling to float over water, by taking him onboard to his own ship. This caused panic among the Ottoman forces and the soldiers began to flee in fear of their lives. The majority of the Ottoman soldiers were killed in the battle, and fifteen ships ran aground in Anatolikoz, the battleground, because the sea was shallow near the shore. Some of those who fell overboard sought refuge in the mountains and survived, while others drowned.

Under such unfavorable circumstances, Uluç Ali Pasha, an experienced corsair sailor, disguised his ship and headed for the open sea with twenty Algerian ships. He fought with the ships on the right side of the enemy that came upon him. He destroyed some ships and killed many soldiers, but also had his own ships hit by cannon fire. He captured a few ships, one of which belonged to Malta. Uluç Ali's fleet, upon wind blowing against them, headed towards Moton without any casualties. Thus, the battle, which continued from morning to sunset in the evening, ended in a very violent and bloody way[14].

THE RESULT OF THE BATTLE

The Ottomans gained the upper hand in the first phase of the battle, and the Allied navy was nearly defeated, with enemy ships being captured one by one, but the reversal of the wind and Müezzinzâde's wrong strategy turned the tide against the Ottomans who in turn suffered a complete rout, which is confirmed both in Ottoman sources and Western literature[15].

In the battle, the Ottomans lost 190 ships and 20.000 people were killed or wounded[16]. Müezzinzâde Ali Pasha, eleven *sancak* governors, the pay-master general, and the majordomo of the imperial arsenal as well as many commanders/captains lost their lives and 3.000 people were taken prisoner. 15.000 galley slaves were released[17]. Pertev Pasha, after losing his ship during battle, was rescued and taken to

[14] On detailed account of the phases of the battle, see Bostan, "La Armada Otomana," 158-160.

[15] Âlî, *Künhü'l-ahbâr*, 459v; Guilmartin, *Galleons and Galleys*, 142-148.

[16] Ibrahim Peçuylu (Peçevi), *Târih*, 2 vols. (Istanbul: Matbaʻa-i ʻĀmira, 1864-66), I, 498; Çelebi, *Tuhfetü'l-Kibâr*, 175. According to various estimates, the Ottoman side lost 15,000, 20,000, and 30,000 lives, see Tommaso Costo, *Giunta di Tre Libri di Tommaso Costo Cittadino Napoletano Al Compendio dell'Istoria del Regno di Napoli* (Venice, 1588), book II, 56.

[17] Âlî, *Künhü'l-ahbâr*, 458v; Peçuylu, *Târih*, I, 498. There were 12,000 Ottoman captives freed from the Ottoman fleet. Five thousand Ottomans were taken prisoner by the Allied Fleet. The Beg of Evvoia

Preveza, and from there he returned to Lepanto by land[18]. The most important loss of the Ottoman navy was the perishment of experienced archers and approximately 4.000 expert sailors in the navy[19], as it would take years to replace the trained and experienced sailor manpower.

Fifteen galleys were sunk and several were destroyed in the Allied fleet. 8.000 people were killed and 21.000 were injured, including many noblemen from Spain, Italy, and Malta. Human casualties cost the Allies badly, and half of their available military strength was effectively out of the fight[20].

The Battle of Lepanto represented the last great crusade of the Catholic Christian world and displayed a temporary victory image since it had no lasting consequences. Cyprus, the main goal of the allied forces, could not be recaptured. Venice was soon forced to break with the alliance to sign a new peace treaty (1573) with the Porte, pay war indemnity for Cyprus, and increase the tribute it paid for the island of Zante. In the years that followed, the Ottoman fleet, which sailed into the Mediterranean with no navy to oppose it, conquered Tunisia (1574). Nevertheless, the battle shattered the myth of the Turks' invincibility, which existed in Europe since the 15th century.

OTTOMANS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE BATTLE

Sultan Selim II learned the outcome of the battle of Lepanto officially on 23 October 1571 in Edirne, with a letter delivered by one of Uluç Ali Pasha's men, fifteen days after the incident[21]. However, considering that the imperial order sent for shipbuilding in shipyards was dated October 21, the news should have arrived earlier[22]. It seems that immediately after the news, a letter from Pertev Pasha in which he explained the outcome of the battle reached Edirne[23]. Word of the defeat had already been spread. When the news reached Grand Vizier Sokullu Mehmed Pasha, he informed the sultan about the developments without losing time. Upon this news, the sultan immediately ordered: «Let Serdâr Pertev Pasha come to Istanbul with the remaining ships»[24].

Following the news of the rout, *Divân-ı Hümayun* (the Imperial Council) made two critical decisions. The first was to take measures with the existing navy by the

---

and the two sons of Müezzinzâde were held captive. For more information, see Costo, *Giunta di Tre Libri*, book II, 56-57.

[18] BOA, KK, 223, 5.

[19] Guilmartin, *Galleons and Galleys*, 149. For the names of some marines, see BOA, KK, 223, 7-14. Also, see Çelebi, *Tuhfetü'l-Kibâr*, 175.

[20] Bostan, "La Armada Otomana," 160.

[21] Selim II left Istanbul on Sunday for Edirne to spend the winter, the day of the Battle (October 7), completely unaware of the outcome of the battle: Türk-İslam Eserleri Müzesi, nr. 1973: Seyyid Lokman, *Zübdetü't-tevârîh*, 83r. The Sultan departed from Istanbul on October 6, one day before the battle, according to a filori register recording the expenses incurred during Selim II's journey to Edirne: Topkapı Palace Museum Archives (TSMA), D. 34, 10v.

[22] Mustafa Selânikî, *Târih*, 2 vols. (Istanbul: Matb-i 'Amire, 1863), I, 84.

[23] The news was delivered on October 23, according Kâtib Çelebi, Çelebi. *Tuhfetü'l-Kibâr*, 175-176.

[24] Lokman, *Zübdetü't-tevârîh*, 83r. Also, see Çelebi, *Tuhfetü'l-Kibâr*, 175-176.

sea and with the armies previously sent to Rumelia for defensive purposes against a possible attack by the enemy navy, which was still sailing in the region, on Ottoman fortifications now left vulnerable in the Adriatic, Peloponnese and Aegean waters. Secondly, edicts were issued to the imperial arsenal and shipyards in order to construct a new navy.

As a first precaution, for the protection of the Peloponnese coast, the vizier Ahmed Pasha and the Rumelian governor-general, Hüseyin Pasha, were asked to secure the coastal positions from the land[25], while the governor-general of Algiers, Uluç Ali Pasha, and the Beg of Rhodes were tasked with taking defensive measures on sea. Besides, an additional imperial edict demanded the safekeeping of all fortresses on the Peloponnese and Adriatic coasts, and if fortresses such as Bar and Ulcinj were difficult to protect, they should be demolished and their weapons and ammunition to be carried to other fortresses[26]. In order to be able to build the great number of vessels for the navy, a long-term shipbuilding activity was initiated in all shipbuilding yards along the Black Sea, Marmara, and Mediterranean coasts, particularly in *Tersâne-i Âmire* (the Imperial Arsenal).

On October 28, 1571, Selim II appointed Uluç Ali Pasha as Chief Admiral and Governor-General of Algiers for his efforts in the battle of Lepanto and changed his name *Uluç* to *Kılıç* as a sign of recompense. Feridun Ahmed Beg, *Reisülküttab* (head of chancery of the imperial council), was tasked with giving him the good news[27]. After securing the area between Chios and Evvoia, Uluç Ali Pasha was asked to join Pertev Pasha with the ships in his entourage and return to Istanbul with the remaining ships of the navy[28].

In Lepanto, Ottoman ships were partly sunk, partly damaged, and a number of sailors fell prisoner to Allied forces, while others were cast adrift and widely dispersed at sea. Only Uluç Ali Pasha left the battleground in a timely manner with his own fleet and proceeded to Moton. As a result, in edicts sent to both Uluç Ali Pasha and Pertev Pasha on the same day (October 28, 1571), they were ordered to bring together the ships that they still had in their possession and move to Evvoia. There, they were to recruit new oarsmen to refill the rowing desks and to secure, the fortresses in the Lepanto Strait. Such orders aimed to counterbalance the actions of Don Juan, the commander of the Allied navy, who for some time considered to penetrate in Ottoman territory as far as the Dardanelles. He, however, was not able to receive the necessary support from the Papacy or Venice, and returned to Messina on November 1 after Philip II ordered him to spend the winter in Italy[29].

Kılıç Ali Pasha, now as the chief admiral, was entrusted with preparing a list of all the ships that went to Lepanto, including those that were destroyed and those that remained. On October 23, Pertev Pasha, still having a fleet under his command, held a council in Lepanto where he officially issued a number of appointments and

[25] BOA, Mühimme Defteri (MD), 16, entry 139 and 144.

[26] BOA, MD, 16, entry 129, 130, and 142.

[27] Selânikî, *Tarih,* I, 84; Âlî, *Künhü'l-ahbâr*, 459v.

[28] For the edict dated October 28, 1571, sent to Uluç Ali Pasha announcing his appointment as Chief Admiral, see BOA, MD, 16, entry 563 and 568; BOA, MD, 19, entry 195; BOA, KK, 74, 403.

[29] Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, II, 1103.

distributed administrative posts. The letters sent by Kılıç Ali Pasha as the governor-general of Algiers confirm the fact that Pertev Pasha made several legal transactions, but Uluç Ali was not with him at the time. Besides, it seems that it was not known yet Ali Pasha was appointed as the grand admiral of the Ottoman navy[30]. The navy most likely sailed from Lepanto the next day and arrived in Evvoia on November 9th, fifteen days later. After meeting with Kılıç Ali Pasha in Evvoia, Pertev Pasha officially learned that Ali Pasha was now the chief admiral[31].

Pertev Pasha stayed in Evvoia until November 24 and moved to Istanbul with only a few ships. He returned home in a devastated state, defeated and without a navy[32]. Although the historical sources claim that he was forced to give up his post on December 30, 1571 due to his failure in Lepanto, documents indicate that he retired voluntarily[33]. He preferred to retire, probably because his viziership title was revoked in the face of public reactions[34]. On the other hand, Kılıç Ali Pasha, who continued his guard duty in the region between the islands for about a month, arrived in Istanbul on December 19, 1571. He arrived with a fleet consisting of forty-two galleys, *bastarda* and galliot and entered directly into the Imperial Arsenal[35]. Sultan Selim II left Edirne immediately after the Ramadan feast (February 16, 1572) and arrived in Halkalı on February 25[36]. After a week here, he arrived in Istanbul by boat and went to Topkapı Palace on March 3[37].

WHAT WERE THE IMPACTS OF THE DEFEAT AT LEPANTO OVER THE OTTOMAN ADMINISTRATION AND SOCIETY?

It is commonly reflected in the chronicles of the period that the ruling class of the Ottomans, notably the sultan, were greatly astonished and frustrated when they learned about the defeat. Regardless of the decisive attitude towards the establishment of a new navy and the swift action that had been taken, the moral pressure of the defeat on the state administration and society influenced everyone profoundly.

It is noteworthy that the defeat of Lepanto, which Şeyhülislâm Ebussuûd Efendi called *hezîmet-i azîme*[38] (a great defeat), was emphasized in the official correspondence of the Imperial Council as *âyine-i takdîrde irâdetullâh bu nev' üzere sûret-pezîr* (a reflection of Allah's will on the mirror of fate). In other words, the Ottomans

[30] BOA, KK, 223, 47-80; BOA, MD, 16, entry 129, 163, and 563.

[31] BOA, KK, 223, 81, 83, 86; BOA, MD, 16, entry 139, 558, 563, and 608.

[32] Selânikî, *Tarih,* I, 82.

[33] Ibidem, I, 82, 84; Lokman, *Zübdetü't-tevârih*, 83v; BOA, Bâb-ı Âsafi, Nişan ve Tahvil Kalemi (A. NŞT), 1066, 135; BOA, MD, 10, entry 272.

[34] Lokman, *Zübdetü't-tevârih*, 83v; Selânikî, *Tarih,* I, 84.

[35] Selânikî, *Tarih,* I, 84.

[36] Lokman, *Zübdetü't-tevârih*, 83v.

[37] BOA, TSMA, D, 34, 10v.

[38] This statement appears in Ebussuûd Efendi's fatwa that zakat could be given in return for shipbuilding expenses after Lepanto. *Şeyhülislâm Ebussuûd Efendi Fetvaları Işığında 16. Asır Türk Hayatı*, edited by M. Ertuğrul Düzdağ (İstanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1983), 63-64.

referred to providence by using proverbs such as *el-harbu sicâlün*[39], which indicate that the outcome of wars changes in shifts. Again, submission was shown in accordance with the verse *el-hükmü lillâhi'l-aliyyi'l-kebîr*[40] which expresses that Allah's judgment had occured. In the face of this defeat, as it was expressed in official documents, *me'mûldür ki an karîb a'dâ-yı dîn ü devlete envâ'-ı kahr u mezellet müyesser etmiş ola*, the Ottomans did not despair and expected that the enemies of religion and the state would be defeated as soon as possible[41]. This approach is the most important indicator of prevailing psychology of the time. The Ottoman administration chose to embrace the defeat as it was, assuming that sometimes themselves, and sometimes the enemy forces, would be victorious, and did not openly blame anyone[42]. This was a cautious and cold-minded reaction[43] of a state accustomed to wars and their consequences; however, the Ottomans did not refrain from analyzing the causes of the defeat either. They also did not hesitate to express the grief and deploration they experienced.

Ottoman historians of the time made some inferences and assessments about the impact of defeat on the state administration and the people, particularly the sultan, as well as the reasons for defeat in material and moral terms. Selânikî's statement, which considers the failure to keep the *ahd* (promise) given to the Venetians as the most important reason for this defeat, should be emphasized. During the conquest of the fortresses of Ulcinj and Bar on the Adriatic coast, Selânikî relates, the Venetian garrison was promised by the vizier Ahmed Pasha that they would be released and safely conveyed to wherever they wanted in exchange for surrendering the fortresses. Pertev Pasha, however, after the conquest, confiscated the Venetians' property and put the *beg*s (Venetian lords and captains) in chains when he came with the navy. This incident called for divine wrath since the promise made at the beginning was not kept, and the curse of the people who fell victim manifested itself as defeat in Lepanto. Selânikî elaborates his explanation by citing verses from the Holy Qur'an:

---

[39] An Arab proverb meaning outcome of wars changes in shifts. See Abdurrahman et-Tikrîtî, *el-Emsâlü'l-Bağdâdiyyetü'l-mukarenetü*, 2 vols. (Bağdad: Matba'at al-'Ani, 1967), II, 151, entry 814.

[40] Abdullah Yusuf Ali, *The Holy Quran: Arabic Text With an English Translation and Commentary* (Kasmiri Bazar, Lahore (India): Dar al-Qıblah, 1937), III, Sūra 40: Mū-min, verse 12, 1265.

[41] BOA, MD, 16, entry 163: the decree dated 28 October 1571 sent to Vizier Pertev Pasha.

[42] BOA, MD, 16, entry 129, 139, 144, 163, and 568: the decrees dated 24 and 28 October 1571 sent to Uluç Ali Pasha, Vizier Ahmed Pasha and Vizier Pertev Pasha.

[43] Busbecq, one of those who closely observed the dignified stance of Kanuni watching from Sarayburnu the entrance of the victorious Ottoman fleet under the command of Piyale Pasha, returning from the campaign of Djerba to Istanbul, states that «Those who saw Solyman's face in this hour of triumph failed to detect in it the slightest trace of undue elation. I can myself positively declare, that when I saw him two days later on his way to the mosque, the expression of his countenance was unchanged: his stern features had lost nothing of their habitual gloom; one would have thought that the victory concerned him not, and that this startling success of his arms had caused him no surprise. So self-contained was the heart of that grand old man, so schooled to meet each change of Fortune however great, that all the applause and triumph of that day wrung from him no sign of satisfaction»: *The Life and Letters of Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, Seigneur of Bousbecque: Knight, Imperial Ambassador*, 2 vols., ed. and transl. by Charles Thornton Foster and E.H. Blackburne Daniell (London: C. Kegan Paul & Co., 1881), I, 321-322.

> Fulfil the Covenant of God when ye have entered into it, and break not your oaths after ye have confirmed them; Indeed ye have made God your surety; for God knoweth all that ye do.[44] Then any one who violates his oath, does so to the harm of his own soul, and anyone who fulfils what he has covenanted with God, -God will soon grant him a great reward.[45]

According to the verses, Selânikî points out that the promise made should be kept, and the agreement reached should be followed, or the consequences will be as bad as in Lepanto[46]. Furthermore, Selânikî emphasizes the deterioration in the lives of the Islamic soldiers, their inclination toward worldly life and sin, as well as the mismanagement of the war and the commanders' falling victim to their own ambitions.

THE ATTITUDE OF SELİM II IN THE FACE OF DEFEAT

Ottoman chroniclers state that Selim II was deeply saddened by the defeat and sought ways to console himself. Selânikî, in particular, claims that Selim II spent very sad and troubled days as a result of the defeat, and writes that the Sultan constantly glorified Allah by saying *Yâ Fettâhe'l-kulûb* (O the conqueror of hearts!), *Yâ Keşşâfe'l-kürûb* (O the suspender of agonies!), *Yâ Allâme'l-guyûb* (O the one who knows the unknown!), and *Yâ Settâre'l-uyûb* (O the concealer of offences!). He also states that the Sultan sought solace in this sad state of affairs by complaining to Celal Bey[47], his companion, who advised the Sultan to meet with the famous *nakibüleşraf*[48] of the period. In response, Selim II sent a dispatch to Sokullu Mehmed Pasha, stating that he wished to meet with the *nakibüleşraf* Seyyid Muhammed Muhterem Efendi (d. 1576)[49] at the mansion of Sultan Bayezid II. The next day, during the meeting between the Sultan and the *nakibüleşraf*, the Sultan seated the Nakibüleşraf on a chair in front of him and started a very friendly conversation while drinking their sherbet. When the talk came to the disaster the Ottoman navy encountered, *nakibüleşraf* reminded the verse «But it is possible that ye dislike a thing which is good for you»[50] and saw it as a warning to Muslims to be disciplined at the hands of the enemy and to come to their senses when their words, deeds, and behaviors were deteriorated. It is understandable that the *nakibüleşraf*, who explained that Allah's eternal will was fulfilled, wished to give the

---

[44] Yusuf Ali, *The Holy Quran*, II, Sūra 16: Nahl, verse 91, 681.

[45] Ibidem, III, Sūra 48: Fat-h, verse 10, 1393

[46] Selânikî, *Tarih,* I, 83.

[47] Celal Bey, real name Hüseyin, had become Selim's companion during his princedom through the recommendation of the prince's tutor Cafer Bey. For more information, see Âli, *Künhü'l-ahbâr*, 483r-484v.

[48] The chief of the descendants of the prophet Muhammed. Bayerle, *Pashas, Begs, and Effendis*, 117.

[49] On Seyyid Muhammed Muhterem Efendi, see İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin İlmiye Teşkilâtı* (Ankara: TTK, 1965), 171. The *nakibüleşraf* registers kept during Seyyid Muhammed Muhterem Efendi time, see Bilgin Aydın, "Meşihat Arşivi'nde Muhafaza Edilen Nakibu'l-eşraf Defterleri," *Türklük Araştırmaları Dergisi* 10 (2001): 21-26.

[50] The full version of the vers is as follows: «Fighting is prescribed for you and ye dislike it. But it is possible that ye dislike a thing which is good for you and that ye love a thing which is bad for you. But God knoweth and ye know not»: Yusuf Ali, *The Holy Quran*, I, Sūra 2: Baqara, verse 216, 84.

Sultan hope and encouragement by bringing forth an alternative explanation. According to him, Allah Almighty wanted the Islamic Sultan to demonstrate his power and strength through the actions he would take in the face of such calamity. The Sultan, who would construct new fleets thanks to the confidence in himself, would be able to demonstrate his strength to the enemy once more. Selânikî records that the advice and recommendations of the *nakibüleşraf*, who ensured the Sultan that this could be achieved with the help of a competent and wise vizier, put the heart of Selim II at ease, and that he was pleased that the man of faith emphasized the importance of being able to build a new navy[51].

According to Gelibolulu Mustafa Âlî (d. 1600), when news of such a defeat, which no eye had ever seen, no ear had ever heard, and no one could have imagined until then, reached Selim II, the entire people, especially the sultan, viziers, and other dignitaries, were overwhelmed with great sorrow and expressed their astonishment by glorifying Allah such as *fe-sübhânellahi'l-kādirü'l-hakîm* and *her şeye hükmeden ve gücü yeten Allah ne yücedir* (How great is Allah, who rules over everything and has power). Also, Âli states that the Ottoman political body referred it to the meaning of the verse[52], *Kıyamet sarsıntısı gerçekten büyük bir olaydır*[53].

Âlî writes that such a disaster had not occurred since the creation of the world and since the Prophet Noah built the ark, and that an important sheikh of the time whom he visited revealed him that Allah Almighty was not only the creator of Muslims but also the provider of all worlds, and exposed some of his thoughts on the apparent reasons for the defeat. Âlî attributes the defeat to Müezzinzade Ali Pasha's unwarranted bravery, as well as the fact that he entered the battle from the front, showing off among the enemy galleys and barges, despite the fact that he would be recognized because of the three lanterns in his *bastarda*. In the end, chief admiral lost his life and the navy was destroyed. He also stated that victory was impossible in the face of injustices and persecutions his fellowmen committed such as the forced recruitment of missing rowers from the coasts of Gallipoli and its surroundings, the confinement of all Muslims and non-Muslims in warehouses to prevent them from escaping, and then putting them on ships, treating them as criminals and chaining them by their feet[54]. Lokman, on the other hand, states that when Sokullu Mehmed Pasha informed the Sultan about the defeat, Sultan Selim II responded by saying *es-sabru miftâhu'l-ferec* (patience is the key to solace)[55].

THE POWER OF FATWA: EBUSSUÛD EFENDİ'S FATWAS ON THE OTTOMAN SOLDIERS AT LEPANTO

After the disastrous end of the battle, Pertev Pasha coming ashore at Preveza, after a ten-day journey on land, arrived in Lepanto on October 17, 1571. Pertev Pasha

[51] Selânikî, *Tarih,* I, 84, 87-90.

[52] Âlî, *Künhü'l-ahbâr*, 458v-459v.

[53] «O mankind! Fear your Lord! For the convulsion of the Hour (of Judgment) will be a thing terrible!»: Yusuf Ali, *The Holy Quran*, II, Sūra 22: Hajj, verse 1, 850.

[54] Âlî, *Künhü'l-ahbâr*, 459r.

[55] Lokman, *Zübdetü't-tevârîh*, 83r.

allocated the deserted prebends of the timar-holders who died in Lepanto to those who displayed merit in the battle[56]. The use of the term *fevt* for deceased timar holders and *şehid* (martry) for *zeamet* holders in these records needs clarification[57]. After his return to Istanbul, Pertev Pasha related his version of the day according to which Selim II and vizier Sokullu Mehmed Pasha were dissatisfied with those who participated in the battle. Therefore, the appointments and conferment granted by Pertev Pasha were not officially confirmed by the court. It seems that the fatwa of the Şeyhülislâm Ebussuûd Efendi was clearly influential in this decision[58]. Ebussuûd Efendi clarified the status of the Ottoman soldiers in terms of religion in his renowned fatwa by making a distinction between those who died fighting in the battle, those who fell into the sea and drowned while fleeing, and those who escaped the battle. He stated that those who survived were blessed veterans, those who died while fighting were martyrs, their names would be remembered fondly in this world and in the hereafter, and they would receive numerous rewards. On the other hand, those who drown while escaping or those who fled will be cursed by Allah[59].

The decision stated in the fatwa was indeed definite. Following this decision, the fatwa was noted in Pertev Pasha's *ruus* register, which he kept after the battle, and the appointments and conferment of the combatants were not implemented. This fatwa entry in the *ruus* register is more detailed than the one in Ebussuûd Efendi's fatwa collections. Presumably, since this entry in the *ruus* register was taken as a basis in practice, it was written in the beginning of the register at a very early time to effectively hinder the administrative transactions Pertev Pasha sanctioned in the first place[60]. It is critical to examine how this fatwa was executed in state practice. This issue was emphasized in an edict sent to the chief admiral Kılıç Ali Pasha on January 24, 1572. He was asked to investigate the surviving captains as well as to record and send in individual registers the captains who did not fight but sailed to the shore and the captains whose ships were sunk by cannon fire. Furthermore, those who fled the battle were ordered to be imprisoned. Those who demonstrated merit were promoted in accordance with their status. Among the famous captains, for example, Arnavud Memi, Murad, Kara Hasan, Ali, İsa, Hasan, and Musa were put on the payroll according to their status[61]. This state of affairs demonstrates that, while the appointments and conferment of the combatants made by Kılıç Ali Pasha were considered, appointments and conferment offered by Pertev Pasha and others were

[56] BOA, KK, 223, 5-6.

[57] BOA, KK, 223, 4-108. «A military fief with an annual income of twenty thousand to one hundred thousand akçes»: Bayerle, *Pashas, Begs, and Effendis*, 163. It is possible that the *zaim*s were considered martyrs because they died in the line of duty while holding a high-level position.

[58] Ebussuûd Efendi issued three fatwas on the developments following Lepanto. See İdris Bostan, "Fetvanın Osmanlı Yönetimi ve Toplum Üzerindeki Etkisi: Ebussuûd Efendi'nin Kıbrıs ve İnebahtı Fetvaları," *İ.Ü. Tarih Dergisi* 76 (2022): 35-62.

[59] BOA, A. NŞT, 1066, 3. İstanbul Müftülük Kütüphanesi, nr. 178, 74v: *Fetâvâ-yı Ebussuûd Efendi*; Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Kütüphanesi, nr. 1074, 79v: *Fetâvâ-yı Ebussuûd Efendi*. Bayezid Devlet Kütüphanesi, nr. 2757, 99v-100r: *Fetâvâ-yı Ebussuûd Efendi.*

[60] BOA, A. NŞT, 1066, 3.

[61] BOA, MD, 10, entry 347.

either rejected or subjected to review[62]. Moreover, Vizier Hüseyin Pasha, the governor-general of Rumelia, was also warned not to make any appointments and conferment to those under his command, since he was conducting operations on the Adriatic coast during and after Lepanto. He was informed on March 23rd, 1572, that the appointments and conferment made in Lepanto were invalid because those who were in the navy in the previous year did not show sufficient effort for the sake of religion and were incompetent, and that he should not make any, because they would not be accepted[63].

On the other hand, the appointments and conferment of those who had shown merit in the military engagements preceding the Battle of Lepanto were approved. For example, Rüstem, the *müteferrika* (member of the elite mounted personal escort of the sultan), who divulged the information that the navy had plundered Crete, received 10.000 *akçe*s[64]. Some of the crew members of Kılıç Ali Pasha received promotions as well. Due to his contributions to the navy, Sinan, the late Turgud Pasha's treasurer who came from Algeria, had his income raised to 55.000 *akçe*s[65]. Ali Macar Reis, who ambushed a transshipment; Memi Zevraki, whose ship was struck by a cannon ball and sank while engaging the enemy, and captains of a galley in the Imperial Fleet, Mahmud and Elvan all received promotions[66].

The sources also show that those in the inner circle of Pertev Pasha and Müezzinzâde Ali Pasha received promotions. The janissary Isa, upon his usefullness, received a *zeamet* when Mahmud Bey, Pertev Pasha's son, was about to have his ship sink after being struck by a cannon ball. Promotions were also granted to Hızır and Mustafa, who served on Pertev Pasha's vessel and demonstrated martial prowess in the battle, and to Mehmed, who was wounded with musket fire[67]. Mustafa, *kapıcılar kethüdası* (the chief of the imperial gatekeepers), who was wounded in battle, taken prisoner, and later saved himself by paying his own ransom, was given a promotion[68]. Hasan, a captain under Müezzinzâde Ali Pasha, was shot by a musket while serving the pasha; as a result, he was promoted to captaincy of a galley in the Imperial Navy. Cafer Agha, the *kapıcıbaşı* of Müezzinzâde Ali Pasha, received a promotion as well[69].

COVERING THE EXPENSES FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW NAVY

The most important problem encountered by the Ottoman court after Lepanto was to replace the destroyed navy with a new one, and if possible, to even build a better one. Immediately following the news of the defeat, edicts were issued to the relevant administrators for the establishment of a new imperial navy, both in

[62] BOA, KK, 223, 79, 88, 89.
[63] BOA, MD, 12, entry 1089: the decrees dated 23 March 1572 sent to Vizier Hüseyin Pasha.
[64] BOA, A. NŞT, 1066, 11, 27, 102.
[65] BOA, KK, 223, 79, 88, 89.
[66] BOA, KK, 223, 12, 19, 38, 78.
[67] BOA, KK, 223, 16-18.
[68] BOA, KK, 223, 6, 25, 34, 64, 82, 108.
[69] BOA, KK, 223, 20, 37.

the Imperial Arsenal and the shipbuilding yards along the Black Sea and other coasts, and on the islands and rivers[70]. Everyone was probably wondering how this was to be achieved since it was well known that shipbuilding was both expensive and time consuming. The Grand Vizier Sinan Pasha, years later, submitted a detailed report to Sultan Murad III in which he explicitly revealed the hardships of building a fleet[71].

As soon as the news of the defeat in Lepanto was received, all Ottoman state officials took action. According to Selânikî, fifteen days after the defeat, with the decision taken on October 21, 1571, *gazâ-yı ekber* (a great war) was declared and an edict was issued for the construction of the navy[72]. The Ottomans, who lost a significant part of their navy in this war, were forced to spend the winter following the war carrying out shipbuilding activities in all of their shipyards. Also, new shipbuilding facilities were established in places suitable for shipyards.

The state treasury fell insufficient to cover all these expenses. The viziers were thus encouraged to financially contribute in construction activities in line with their own economic means. The imperial council dispatched a series of edicts ordering the *reaya* to chop off timber from the forests of the Kocaeli region, renowned as the «sea of trees». To meet the needs, the Ottomans also levied *avariz* taxes (extraordinary military levy) and recruited rowers from imperial lands[73].

The navy's construction had to be finished in time for the following year's naval season. In absence of such an effort, the Ottoman Empire's prestige would be shattered, and it would be difficult to regain it. The grand vizier Sokullu Mehmed Pasha and the chief admiral Kılıç Ali Pasha made every effort to accomplish the task. Sokullu Mehmed Pasha personally inspected the shipbuilding activities by visiting the docks on a regular basis. It seems Kılıç Ali Pasha had some doubts on whether it was possible to rebuild a new navy of this scale. He, after all, had not previously held office in Istanbul, and had no understanding of the strength and capabilities of the empire. He told in a conversation with Sokullu Mehmed Pasha that the problem was not building ships but to provide the needed equipments such as five to six hundred anchors for 200 ships, as well as mooring lines, ropes, and gaff-topsails etc. In return, Sokullu Mehmed Pasha uttered his now famous reply:

> *Paşa Hazretleri sen henüz bu devlet-i aliyyeyi bilmemişsin, be-vallâhi böyle itikad eyle bu devlet ol devlettir ki, murâd edinürse cümle donanmanın lengerlerin gümüşden, resenlerin ibrişimden yelkenlerin atlastan etmekte su'ûbet çekmez.*[74]

In other words, he instilled confidence and encouragement in the chief admiral by stating that if the Ottoman state so desired, it would have no trouble making the entire anchors of the navy out of silver, its ropes out of thrown silk, and its gaff-topsails out of satin.

The question of whether a tax was collected from the people for the

[70] On rebuilding the navy after Lepanto, see İdris Bostan, "La Reconstrucción," 253-297.
[71] *Koca Sinan Paşa'nın Telhisleri*, edited by Halil Sahillioğlu (İstanbul: IRCICA, 2004), 4.
[72] This decision was taken on October 21, 1571. See Selânikî, *Tarih*, I, 84.
[73] Ibidem, I, 84-85.
[74] Peçuylu, *Târih*, I, 498-499.

reconstruction of the navy and whether all expenses were paid from the state treasury must have attracted the attention of chroniclers of the time, as different opinions were expressed. It appears that the state treasury was not able to cover all expenses, because, as mentioned above, according to Selânikî, the viziers were encouraged to participate in construction activities according to their own economic power[75].

During extensive shipbuilding activities, the chroniclers Mustafa Âlî and Peçuylu claim that no one was actually offered to build ships. In their description there was no shortage of money in the treasury[76]. Kâtib Çelebi, on the other hand, quoting some captains of the imperial arsenal who lived in those days, states that certain statesmen were offered to build ships according to their financial status, which corresponds with the information provided by Selânikî[77]. It might be established that the vizier Lala Mustafa Pasha built three galleys in Antalya, Piyale Pasha built several galleys in Rhodes and Kocaeli, and *reisülküttab* Feridun Ahmed Bey built a *galliot* in Silivri[78].

The sultan also provided support from his personal treasury to cover the shipbuilding costs. Selim II, who arrived in Istanbul on March 3, 1572, fifteen days after leaving Edirne, soon went to Kâğıthane and personally inspected the shipbuilding activities on site and gave 1.000 filorin to the chief admiral Kılıç Ali Pasha to be spent on shipyard expenses. The following month, on April 9, he went to the Tophane and was briefed on the new cannons being cast; rewarded the personnel for their services with *hil'at*s (robe of honor) and precious fabrics to head of artilleryman and two chiefs of cannon casters, 200 filorin to the other laborers as well as 100 filorin to the *acemî oğlan*s (conscript boys)[79].

TWO FATWAS OF EBUSSUÛD EFENDİ ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF NAVY

The issue of how to cover the costs of the ships to be built was addressed in Ebussuûd Efendi's fatwas, and the şeyhülislâm carefully selected the terminology in his legal writings to express the framework of the fatwa in the most effective manner possible. He encouraged the voluntary construction of ships, the provision of war materials and support for the needs of the warriors, and the payment of zakat. It is obvious that şeyhülislâm used the fatwa's influence to encourage wealthy Muslims to take action and support the procurement of the necessary materials and ammunition for the newly constructed navy. In this way, Ebussuûd Efendi contributed to the post-Lepanto preparations by issuing two fatwas. According to one of them, those

[75] Selânikî, *Tarih*, I, 84-85.

[76] This inference of Âlî is based on the combination of the *Künhü'l-ahbâr*, TY 5959, p. 459v, housed in Istanbul University Library of Rare Works and *Gelibolulu Mustafa Âlî ve Künhü'l-ahbâr'ında II. Selim, III. Murat ve III. Mehmet Devirleri,* 2 vols., edited by F. Çerçi, (Kayseri: Erciyes Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2000), II, 83, and the edition of *Künhü'l-ahbâr* prepared according to four copies.

[77] Âlî, *Künhü'l-ahbâr*, 459v; Peçuylu, *Târih*, I, 499; Çelebi, *Tuhfetü'l-Kibâr*, 176; Selânikî, *Tarih*, I, 85.

[78] BOA, MD, 10, entry 216, 258, and 265; BOA, MD, 16, entry 263, entry 287; BOA, MD, 18, entry 215.

[79] BOA, TSMA, D, 34, 10v.

who support Islamic soldiers with their wealth and lives in order to provide them with weapons and other necessities were also holy warriors, and that jihad with wealth was even more virtuous.

The first fatwa[80] on jihad (holy war) with wealth[81] underlines the fact that the sultan personally built the destroyed navy and that statesmen also helped in this regard. For this reason, the following statements were made regarding the need for the wealthy to assist ghazis: *kalb-i hâzır ve safâ-yı hâtır ile birer mikdar mâl bezl edüp asâkir-i İslam'a mu'âvenet ve müzâheret eyleseler anlar dahi [zümre-i] guzât ve mücâhidînden ma'dûd.*

That is, if they voluntarily and willingly donate a certain amount of wealth to Islamic soldiers, they will also be considered ghazis and *mücâhid*s. Therefore, the first fatwa does not deal with the issue of zakat. The other is that wealthy Muslims could count what they spend on the needs of the navy ghazis as zakat. However, there is no mention of building a navy or providing ships in this one.

According to Ebussuûd Efendi, in order to avenge the defeat suffered by the Islamic soldiers at sea, the sultan personally transferred a large sum of money for the construction of a large navy, which was unprecedented in any era, and that prominent statesmen also attempted to provide the necessary materials and ammunition, and explained that in response to the Islamic soldiers' rushing to holy war with their lives, the rich people should help them with their wealth. He backed up his point of view with selected examples from the lives of the Prophet's companions. Emphasizing that jihad with wealth is more virtuous than jihad with life, the şeyhülislâm was also stating that naval warfare was not the work of ordinary people, and that since the war on ships was fought with cannons, muskets and other instruments of war, the use of these weapons required expertise and that only soldiers such as artillerymen, janissaries and *azab* (an auxiliary soldier) could perform this task. Therefore, he declared that providing them with the necessary weapons and supplies would be jihad with wealth. Furthermore, it is understood that the scope of the fatwa includes help and support of unwealthy Muslims, too. It is noteworthy that in this fatwa, the incentive to help the naval equipments was not described as zakat and it was included under the heading of «Kitāb al-jihād» in the fatwa collections.

In addition to the first one, Ebussuûd Efendi issued another important fatwa, instructing the wealthy to give their zakat to be spent on the war expenses of navy ghazis. Şeyhülislâm was well aware that jihad with wealth would not be enough in the face of the great need for financial aid for the equipment of the newly constructed navy and the military equipment of the warriors. According to this fatwa, he sanctioned the paying of the Muslims' zakat of that year along with their unpaid zakats and the amounts to be paid in the following years. Ebusssûd Efendi assured the believers in his fatwa that this procedure was acceptable and legitimate in terms

[80] Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Kütüphanesi, nr. 1074, 78v-79v: *Fetâvâ-yı Ebussuûd Efendi*; İstanbul Müftülük Kütüphanesi, nr. 178, pp. 74r-v: *Fetâvâ-yı Ebussuûd Efendi*.

[81] On the fact that jihād with wealth is one of the incomes of the treasury of Islamic states and could be used mainly for war expenses, see Burhâneddin el-Buhârî (d. 1219), *el-Muhîtü'l-Burhânî fi'l-fıkhi'n-Nu'mânî*, edited by Abdülkerim Sâmi el-Cündî, 2 vols. (Beyrut: Dâru'l-Kütübi'l-İlmiyye, 2004), II, 368-369. Also, see Erkal, "Beytülmâl," *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi* 6 (1992): 93.

of Islamic law[82]. The prevailing opinion here was that zakat was given for the war expenses of ghazis, which proves the magnitude of the predicament of the time. What is noteworthy in this fatwa is that the zakat was given to the ghazis for their own needs and armament, rather than for the construction of the navy[83].

All of these developments not only show the Ottomans' commitment to the Islamic law, but also demonstrate that the fatwas were influential in military affairs. In this regard, it appears that some fatwas served as sources for not only religious issues, but also for historical incidents. So, any approach on Ottoman political body attempting to explain everything solely with political incentives is doomed to be questionable unless it took the influence of fatwas within the Ottoman society. The fact that fatwa texts, as invisible forces penetrating deeply into society and administration, was referred to in solving religious-legal-political issues even centuries later demonstrates the power of the mechanism[84].

It is a significant mistake to assess the Battle of Lepanto solely depending on its repercussions in Europe and to ignore the Ottoman experience. What Ottoman sources and archival material indicate regarding the preparations before the battle, the battle itself, and the events that followed is crucial. The records kept during the campaign, as well as the decisions made in the Imperial Council before and after the battle, shed light on the events from the Ottoman perspective. Ottoman chroniclers provide sufficient detail on the engagement and even how the defeat was received by the Ottoman public.

In this regard, there is no doubt that the defeat at Lepanto had political, economic, administrative, legal, and even emotional/spiritual consequences and effects. The efforts of the leading figures of the time alongside Sultan Selim II, to establish a new navy demonstrated that it was not impossible for the Ottomans, who had enough experience and resources, to act quickly and replace what they had lost. However, one would wonder how would it be possible to replace the navy's lost experienced admirals and sailors in a short period of time?

---

[82] *Şeyhülislâm Ebussuûd Efendi Fetvaları Işığında 16. Asır Türk Hayatı*, edited by M. Ertuğrul Düzdağ (Istanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 63-64). This fatwa is mentioned in the following books in the section of Kitāb al-jihād: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Kütüphanesi, nr. 1074, 79v: *Fetâvâ-yı Ebussuûd Efendi*; İstanbul Müftülük Kütüphanesi, nr. 178, 74r-v: *Fetâvâ-yı Ebussuûd Efendi*. However, the same fatwa is mentioned in the following versions in the section of Kitāb al-zakāt: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Kütüphanesi, nr. 1074, 24v: *Fetâvâ-yı Ebussuûd Efendi*, and Bayezid Devlet Kütüphanesi, nr. 2757, 28r: *Fetâvâ-yı Ebussuûd Efendi*.

[83] For detailed information, see Bostan, "Fetvanın Osmanlı," 35-62.

[84] The issue of collecting zakat to help the navy was back on the Ottoman agenda before the Balkan War (1912-1913) and was discussed through this fatwa of Ebussuûd Efendi. See Bostan, "Fetvanın Osmanlı," 53-55; Hamdi Çilingir, "Zekâta Muhtaç Donanma, Donanmaya Muhtaç Devlet, II. Meşrutiyet Devri Osmanlı Devleti'nde İane-i Donanma'ya Zekât Meselesi," *İnsan ve Toplum* 9, no. 4 (2019): 53-77.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Costo, Tommaso. *Giunta di Tre Libri di Tommaso Costo Cittadino Napoletano Al Compendio dell'Istoria del Regno di Napoli*. Venice, 1588.

De Herrera, Fernando. *Relacion de la guerra de Cipre, y sucesso de la batalla Naval de Lepanto*. Sevilla, 1572.

El-Buhârî, Burhâneddin. *El-Muhîtü'l-Burhânî fi'l-fıkhi'n-Nu'mânî*, edited by Abdülkerim Sâmi el-Cündî. Beyrut: Dâru'l-Kütübi'l-İlmiyye, 1424/2004.

Et-Tikrîtî, Abdurrahman. *El-Emsâlü'l-Bağdâdiyyetü'l-mukārenetü*. Bağdad: Matba'at al-'Ani, 1967.

Fetâvâ-yı Ebussuûd Efendi. Bayezid Devlet Kütüphanesi (Bayezid State Library), nr. 2757.

Fetâvâ-yı Ebussuûd Efendi. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Kütüphanesi (Directorate of Religious Affairs Library), nr. 1074.

Fetâvâ-yı Ebussuûd Efendi. İstanbul Müftülük Kütüphanesi (Istanbul Muftiate Library), nr. 178.

Gelibolulu Mustafa Âlî. *Künhü'l-ahbâr*, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Nadir Eserler Kütüphanesi (Istanbul University Rare Books Library), TY. 5959.

Gelibolulu Mustafa Âlî ve Künhü'l-ahbâr'ında II. Selim, III. Murat ve III. Mehmet Devirleri, vol. II, edited by Faris Çerçi. Kayseri: Erciyes Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2000.

Kâtib Çelebi. *Tuhfetü'l-Kibâr fî Esfâri'l-Bihâr*, edited by İdris Bostan. Ankara: TÜBA, 2018.

Koca Sinan Paşa'nın Telhisleri, edited by Halil Sahillioğlu. İstanbul: IRCICA, 2004.

Naîmâ Mustafa Efendi. *Târih-i Na'îmâ*, edited by Mehmet İpşirli. Ankara: TTK, 2007.

Peçuylu, Ibrahim. *Târih*. İstanbul: Matba'a-i 'Âmira, 1864-66.

Seyyid Lokman. *Zübdetü't-tevârîh*. Türk-İslam Eserleri Müzesi, nr. 1973.

Şeyhülislâm Ebussuûd Efendi Fetvaları Işığında 16. Asır Türk Hayatı, edited by M. Ertuğrul Düzdağ. İstanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1983.

The Holy Quran: Arabic Text With an English Translation and Commentary, edited by Abdullah Yusuf Ali. Lahore: Dar al-Qıblah, 1937.

The Life and Letters of Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, Seigneur of Bousbecque: Knight, Imperial Ambassador, 2 vols., edited and translated by Charles Thornton Foster and E.H. Blackburne Daniell. London: C. Kegan Paul & Co., 1881.

Secondary Sources

Aydın, Bilgin. "Meşihat Arşivi'nde Muhafaza Edilen Nakibu'l-eşraf Defterleri." *Türklük Araştırmaları Dergisi* 10 (2001): 21-26.

Bayerle, Gustav. *Pashas, Begs, and Effendis: A Historical Dictionary of Titles and Terms in the Ottoman Empire*. Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1997.

Bostan, İdris. "Fetvanın Osmanlı Yönetimi ve Toplum Üzerindeki Etkisi: Ebussuûd Efendi'nin Kıbrıs ve İnebahtı Fetvaları." *İ.Ü. Tarih Dergisi* 76 (2022): 35-62.

—. "La Armada Otomana: De la Conquista de Chipre a la Batalla de Lepanto." In *Lepanto. La Mar Roja de Sangre, Lepanto*, edited by Àlex Claramunt Soto, 127-169. Madrid: Desperta Ferro, 2021.

—. "La Reconstrucción de la Armada Otomana." In *Lepanto. La Mar Roja de Sangre,* edited by Àlex Claramunt Soto, 253-297. Madrid: Desperta Ferro, 2021.

Braudel, Fernand. *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, 2 vols. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.

Çilingir, Hamdi. "Zekâta Muhtaç Donanma, Donanmaya Muhtaç Devlet, II. Meşrutiyet Devri Osmanlı Devleti'nde İane-i Donanma'ya Zekât Meselesi." *İnsan ve Toplum* 9, no. 4 (2019): 53- 77.

Dilçin, Cem. *Yeni Tarama Sözlüğü*. Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu, 1983.

Erkal, Mehmet. "Beytülmâl." *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi* 6 (1992): 90-94.

Guilmartin, John F. *Galleons and Galleys*. London: Cassell & Co., 2002.

İlgürel, Mücteba. "Levent." *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi* 27 (2003): 149-151.

Uzunçarşılı, İsmail Hakkı. *Osmanlı Devletinin İlmiye Teşkilâtı*. Ankara: TTK, 1965.

Recibido: 3 de septiembre de 2022
Aceptado: 12 de abril de 2023