


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## ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF İOANNA KUÇURADI

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IOANNA KUÇURADI  
GLIMPSES AT HER VIEWS OF ETHICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

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It was a happy, and, as it proved later, an auspicious day, when I first met Ioanna Kuçuradi, 26 years ago. It was in Varna in 1973 at the XVth World Congress of Philosophy when we both, fresh Ph.D. holders, read our first paper at a world conference. I still remember the title of her paper: "In the Face of Effaced Faces". The section was chaired by the late professor John Theodoracopoulos who was so fascinated by the magic of her speech that allowed her double the time allotted to ordinary participants. We were all so deeply enchanted by the sensitivity, thoughtfulness, spirituality and genuine philosophical mood of the paper of that so beautiful and bright young lady that we all anticipated the leading role she was destined to play in the world philosophical community. From that blessed day we were both tied with a solid, fruitful and affectionate friendship.

In this historic for our acquaintance paper were spermatically contained most of the key-ideas we find later in many of the numerous and important books and articles of hers. From that time on Ioanna Kuçuradi emphasized the responsibility and honesty of the artist, of the philosopher and of the intellectual in general and their role to distinguish the Man from the man of the given time and place, i.e. "to show Man to men". The intellectual and artistic works that enhance Man offer visions, enlarge human potentialities and create new values, she says. Since then she saw creation as a reaction to the effacement and the obliteration of the human face and as a restoration of it. And she set as the task of the philosopher to formulate in a new language "touchstones for testing our valuable experience" such as "Kant's practical imperative and Camus's altruistic individualism".

This concern for the preservation of the human face beyond theories and metatheories remained vigorous throughout all her strenuous campaign for the cultivation of philosophy in every corner of the earth transcending all cultural, national, linguistic, racial and religious particularities. Her firm and unbending devotion to philosophy as a value in itself but also as a means and strategy for facing and perhaps solving world problems was her revolt against whatever threatened the human face and its values: honesty, freedom, righteousness, love, authenticity and true communication. It was her revolt against all stumbling blocks thrown in the development of man's potentialities qua Man, her resistance to all forms of injustice. The title of paper published in *Philosophers on Their Own Work* 11 in 1984 is very

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characteristic: "From Revolt to Philosophy". She then described her writings as a revolt "a) against the value waste" between relativism and absolutism, a revolt that led her to the analysis of "right evaluation" as a "complex cognitive activity" and b) against the unscrupulous violation of human rights that made her "start exploring both the concepts and the documents of human rights".

As a matter of fact, soon after her early commitment to the kingdom of ideas with the poems "Behind the Curtains", Ioanna, "a vindictive partisan of thought", as she says in one of her verses, tore the curtains and made her revolt with a lifelong dedication to philosophy as freedom and liberation, as sword of justice and vindication of what is right and holy to man, as armor against all forms of oppression. Because of her conception of philosophy as a revolt, besides her notable contribution to the history of philosophy and to systematic philosophy both of which she cultivated in a personal, original and epistemically justified manner showing particular interest in the fields of axiology, ethics, philosophy of art and philosophy of human rights she took a rigorous stand upon most great problems and used all her efforts to bring close together and join one to the other philosophers and intellectuals from all over the world.

Daughter of George and of Euphemia Kuçuradi of Greek origin, Ioanna was born in Istanbul in 1936 and studied at Zapeion Greek Gymnasium for Girls, distinguished for her cleverness, high records and beauty. She studied philosophy at the University of Istanbul from which very young she received her Ph.D. She was elected assistant professor at the same University and later on at the Atatürk University, Erzurum. She soon became lecturer, associate and full professor at the department of Philosophy of Hacettepe University in Ankara of which she became Head of the Department since its establishment in 1969. She is president of the Philosophical Society of Turkey since 1979. She is also member the Society for Classical Studies in Turkey, of the Turkish Society for Social Sciences, of the German Cultural Institute, Ankara, of the Foundation for the Economic and Social History of Turkey, vice-president for Asia of the Afro-Asian Philosophical Association, member of the Steering Committee from 1983, secretary general from 1988 and president from 1998 of the International Federation of Philosophical Societies (F.I.S.P.). She is, moreover, member of the International Institute of Philosophy, life-long member of the Greek Philosophical Society, president of the Turkish National Committee for the Decade of Human Rights Education, and has recently (1998) assumed the UNESCO Chair for the Philosophy of Human Rights at the Center for Research and Application of the Philosophy of Human Rights at Hacettepe University in Ankara. In 1995 she was awarded the Goethe Medal by Klaus Kinkel and in 1996 she became honorary doctor of the University of Crete.

Despite her active, effective and dynamic presence in all these Societies, in National and International Organizations and Advisory Councils, Professor Kuçuradi has done much original, inspired and inspiring, solid and influential philosophical work. She has written a collection of poems in Greek (*Behind the Curtains* 1962), ten philosophical books in Turkish and more than eighty articles in Turkish, Greek, English, French and German, some of which have been translated into Russian, Bulgarian, Polish, Finnish, Chinese, Swedish etc. She speaks and writes in at least five languages and this is one of the reasons she is very well known and distinguished in the world philosophical community. She has translated Kant's three major works from German into Turkish and the books of the Turkish authors Kemal

Demirel, *Antigone* and Özdemir Ince *Twelve Poems for Giannis Ritsos* into Greek (1970,1979). She is editor of more than twenty volumes of Seminars and Proceedings of various international and local conferences in all of which she has elaborated scholarly and sensitive prefaces and introductions. Among the more recent I mention her excellent Prologue and the long Introduction to the Seminar *The Concept of Knowledge* (Kluwer 1995) and the Introduction to the Seminar *Ethics and the Professions: Medicine, Business, Media, Law* (Springer 1999). Both these volumes host interesting papers of eminent epistemologists and moral philosophers. Professor Kuçuradi established the Balkan Symposia of Philosophy held in Turkey, Bulgaria and Greece.

Initially her philosophical interests focused on the concept of the tragic and on philosophical anthropology. She thus worked on F. Nietzsche, Max Scheler and A. Schopenhauer before arriving soon to personal philosophical proposals with her monograph *Man and Values* in 1971. Subsequently she became interested in moral philosophy and her book *Ethics* in 1977 became a best seller and had many editions. Later on she occupied herself with the philosophy of art (*Art from a Philosophical Point of View*, 1980), which she sharply distinguished from Aesthetics.

From the 80's on she paid particular attention on the major world problems (*Among the Events of our Times*, 1981 and *Uludağ Papers*, 1988) and she directed all her philosophical vigor and armor to the analysis, foundation, respect, protection and education of human rights. She wrote many articles, edited numerous volumes on this subject and a book on human rights is soon forthcoming. She is extremely influential in expressing her passion for freedom, justice, equality, tolerance, peace, development, education, universality, etc. in a strenuous effort to help the mutual understanding of peoples also enhancing respect of their identities. This passion of hers for the illumination and perhaps solution of world problems through philosophical analysis and right moral evaluation did not monopolize her philosophical insights and did not remove her from strict theoretical problems and academic commitments.

From the beginning and throughout all her philosophical itinerary Ioanna Kuçuradi is haunted by the problem of value especially as a problem of evaluation of actions, persons and events. She finds both the relativistic and absolutist theories of value insufficient for what she calls right evaluation. She considers evaluation to be a complex cognitive activity presupposing different kinds of knowledge and leading to the distinction between value and values. She defines value as "the special place of a thing among other things of the same kind" and posits right evaluation in the framework of the ethical relation, a "personal-individual relation of a singular-unique man, with all his personal characteristics, who acts in a singular-unique situation". Intention and aim constitute only the "third component" of an action. The specificity of an action constitutes its value and determines its ethical value with respect to the possibilities and achievements of man. As she puts it "the ethical value of an action seems to lie in its significance for Man taken as a species", i.e. what matters is "what is protected or injured by this action". These personal views, as delineated in her paper "From Revolt to Philosophy" can be seen as the core of a philosophically interesting theory of value which she develops in her *Man and Values*, and in her *Ethics*. In these books Ioanna Kuçuradi is mostly concerned with the exhaustive analysis of the activity of evaluation, with clarity and meticulous distinction and classification of concepts, avoiding the philosophical

jargon, writing in a literary, sometimes poetic, style and tending towards the praxis than the theory of philosophy.

Regarding aesthetic value, she also seems to adopt an anthropological view with ontological and cognitive foundations, substituting aesthetics as a philosophical discipline by the "philosophy of art" because she does not agree with psychological and psychoanalytical approaches. She sees the evaluation of literary works as a complex cognitive activity in which various types and kinds of knowledge play their role.

The concept of value is central to her ethics. She faces moral problems as problems of value in human relations and actions. In her paper "A Different Approach to Ethics" she draws the distinction between morals and morality as systems of norms of behavior and norms evaluation, also distinguishing among them according to their local-historical or universal character within cultural traditions and ethics as a philosophic activity, a cognitive activity that has and should have a universal character. Several norms of systems of morals are different and changing in particular cultures. This is not the case with the norms of morality, but this does not mean that the latter constitute a synthesis of the local norms found in the various cultural traditions. Local norms of behavior, though sometimes obsolete, do not harm as long as they "do not contradict human dignity or the demands that human rights express".

Professor Kuçuradi does not think that common norms or "global morality", as a source of "world culture", as she puts it in her paper "Cultural Morals and Global Morality in the Light of Ethics", badly needed nowadays, should be a synthesis of the "substances" of different cultures, a synthesis of "cultural morals valid locally". In order to become common norms of morality, she says, they should be "deduced from the knowledge or the value of Man with regard to the historical conditions of every age, no matter whether we find some of them in this or that culture or not". And she considers as examples of such norms "human or basic rights", as the real conditions for the possibility of the development of human potentialities of individuals qua human beings. The protection of basic human rights seems to her to be a "global aim", the principle of national and international policies and the "point of orientation" for a global morality leading to a global culture. In her paper "Cultures and 'World Culture'" Professor Kuçuradi considers the much discussed topic of the "plurality and unity of cultures" and that of "universality and specificity of cultural values", as she recently put, to be a pseudo-problem taking culture in the singular to be "the totality of human activities considered to afford to individuals the possibility to cultivate –to actualize and develop– their human potentialities". And it is in this sense that she understands the "right to culture". Thus, she concludes, "culture –in the singular– could freely develop one culture –in the plural–, a world culture".

For Professor Kuçuradi ("A Different Approach to Ethics") "norms in general are not knowledge". So, according to her, a proposition expressing a norm can be neither true nor false and thus, "we need a different epistemic criterion in order to evaluate them". Norms of evaluation do not lead to the knowledge of the value of a concrete unique object. As value criteria they play the role of major propositions from which the value of an action is drawn, but this process does not lead to the knowledge of the objective value of a given action or object. Norms of behavior are also deduced in different ways, both "from experience by

induction and... by comparison of different given conditions in the light of the knowledge of the value of Man by *reductio ad absurdum*". The former possess a practical function intending to protect something considered valuable, but soon loose their meaning and this leads to a "crisis of values". The latter, deriving from the knowledge of the value of Man "are deduced from this knowledge directly or indirectly". Norms, "may become objects of knowledge, but themselves, as propositions are not knowledge, i.e., they have no object independent of themselves", as she puts it. Morals and morality constitute only one part of the problems of ethics as a cognitive philosophical discipline. Morals are of interest to ethics because they are "among the determinants of the various components of action and their epistemic differences bear different implications for the value of an action".

She believes that present moral philosophy as a normative discipline putting forth universal moral principles and metaprinciples both as metaethics and metamorality has only epistemological interest and has reached an epistemic deadlock. So she tries to sketch "a different approach to the questions of ethics" aiming at shedding light on human relations as a human phenomenon and putting forth verifiable and falsifiable knowledge of it, without giving any ready-made precepts for behavior. She suggests that the accomplishment of right actions "depends on knowledge, on different kinds of knowledge". In the framework of ethical relations the most decisive component of an action is, for her, evaluation as a "complex cognitive activity proceeding from understanding to discovering the specificity of an object, action, etc. and to putting forth its significance for humanity or its ethical value". She considers as a second component of an action the experience of the acting person in connection with the evaluation he made and his cultural or philosophical-anthropological value knowledge. As further components she takes men's needs, objectives in life, cultural ideals and the possibility of actualizing human potentialities. The latter component constitutes "Man's value". Cultural norms do not lead to the knowledge of the value of an action done for another person. And new syntheses of them, given their epistemic specificity, do not show the way out of "the crisis of cultures". What the world needs today is, according to her, philosophical knowledge in evaluating moral conceptions, rules and principles and an education leading to cognitive ethics as distinguished from morals and morality. Such knowledge enhances moral autonomy and freedom and fosters the decision to live ethically and to face effectively the crisis of cultures.

In her article "Knowledge of Value and Values: A sine qua non for Human Flourishing" she returns to the "epistemological specificity of value norms", arguing that "the knowledge of ethical value of an action as a unique whole, performed in a given unique situation, can be obtained through the activity of right evaluation, in which context the term 'right' denotes that the activity is carried out so as to lead to its goal as a human activity". Through an anthropological approach again she seems to identify human values with "human activities carried out in accordance with the goals peculiar to each of them", social values with "ideas and principles aiming at the permanent creation of conditions for the flourishing of human beings as human beings" and ethical values with certain personal characteristics and experiences in interpersonal relations. Knowledge of value and of values constitutes for her "the theoretical ground of philosophical education" as 'propaedeutic' for the accomplishment of 'Man's job' and thus of human flourishing.

In her very influential book *Ethics*, Professor Kuçuradi makes a successful effort to shed light on action in the context of ethical relations. She holds that good will is not sufficient for ethically valuable human action; pure knowledge of values and philosophical knowledge of the human activity of evaluation are also required. She distinguishes the ethical relationship from other kinds of human relations and emphasizes its uniqueness. Only right evaluation, she says, can lead to the knowledge of the value of an action. This sort of evaluation is not concerned with the consequences that an action has for the acting person, but is determined by the conviction experientially derived from the knowledge of values, from the moral quality of the intentions of the agent and his insight to find what ought to be done in each case. In this book the author focuses on the meaning of ethical values such as respect, love, trust and gratitude, as well as on traditional moral virtues.

Applied ethics, the branch of ethics that is most flourishing nowadays, could not have been a matter of indifference to a philosopher who has always regarded facing world problems as the main task of philosophy. She has often discussed moral problems in Medicine and the Environment and most recently edited a very interesting volume on *Ethics of the Professions: Medicine, Business, Media, Law (1999)*, consisting of papers presented to a seminar on "Philosophical Ethics and Professional Ethics". Her views on professional ethics are excellently delineated in the thoughtful Introduction which, for all its critical spirit, is very sensitive and extremely informative of this lately developed but fully flourishing philosophical realm.

Discussing the different kinds of "ethical problems" she draws an interesting ontological and epistemological distinction between the problems of ethics as a philosophical discipline related to decisions and actions in relation with other persons or with oneself from the ethical problems faced with in life. The former call for definitions whereas the answer to the latter is not philosophical. She finds that "the questions raised *now* in various professional ethics belong to neither of these kinds of ethical problems". Thus, while she admits that ethics is now "in vogue", that recently we witness a 'renaissance of ethics', a 'new ethics' in dealing with global problems, she seems to deplore the assumption that this occurs "*outside philosophy*", since the questions asked in professional ethics are different from those raised both in philosophy and in everyday life, and "concern what one should or should not do *in general* while practicing the given profession", i.e. they concern moral or legal norms. She points out that the answers to questions of professional ethics "appear as international declarations, conventions and moral professional codes". Applied ethics, however, is something more than professional codes, does not always revolve around the justification of norms, it has a methodology of its own and is not outside philosophy but offers a unique justification of philosophical ethics. Kuçuradi is right, however, in rejecting relativism and the "demand that 'science' should be 'value-free'", since, as a matter of fact, this resulted in the elimination of all kinds of value in scientific research, in the name of progress, until lately it "has given rise to the search for *common norms* and metanorms to be made valid globally".

She very aptly explains the birth of bioethics from the need to put limits to the indiscriminate use of scientific knowledge and, by putting forth the crucial question of the "what for" of the scientific activities, she opens the way towards a more humane aspect of science and technology. She considers ecological problems to be major world problems arisen mainly from *voluntary* global decisions dictated by developmental policies which

have led to "indiscriminate technological use of scientific knowledge", irrespective of their effects on human beings and on nature. And she suggests that environmental and business ethics should "focus on ethical value problems" connected with activities and decisions which have created the environmental problems. Interesting are also her views about the role of the journalist as a mediator and his duty to acquire philosophical knowledge, i.e. ethical value knowledge, in order to make right evaluations of events and thus decide what makes a mere happening a "news". And, lastly, she is concerned with the ethical problems in legislation and in the administration of public affairs as a meeting point of philosophical ethics and law. She clearly distinguishes between cultural norms and human rights as well as between acting according to norms and acting ethically. Her view of applied ethics has a personal tone and a philosophical insight missing in most ordinary anthologies and collections of papers and this marks a significant contribution to the extremely rich recent literature on this subject.

Human rights have a special place and play a very important role in the ethics and in the philosophy of value of Ioanna Kuçuradi, although again in a most personal and thus different way than that met in recent social, political and moral philosophy which have led to rights-based moral theories. The violations of human rights during the last decades were another huge stumbling block against which she made her revolt. The machinations invented to disguise the most unscrupulous violations of these rights have led her to the exploration, clarification, and discrimination of the concepts of the basic rights and to the philosophical analysis of their declarations, conventions and protocols. She attempted interesting classifications of them and examined the impact of their violations on matters of social justice. This is how she links ethics with human rights. She says in her article "From Revolt to Philosophy": "If the 'value' or 'dignity of Man' means 'his special place in the universe', that which constitutes this place is certain human potentialities and their actualized outcome in history. Thus the protection of human potentialities in individuals constitutes a seemingly adequate criterion for the determination of the basic rights of the individual, i.e. human rights". And, although all human rights, i.e., rights belonging to all human beings equally, are basic rights, Ioanna makes the distinction between those that are "demands demanding the direct protection of the human potentialities in individuals" (security and fundamental freedoms) and those demands "related to the *general preconditions* affording the possibility to develop one's potentialities (subsistence, rights to education, to health, to work, etc.) Whereas the former depend on individuals, the latter "can be protected only indirectly through socio-economic rights *given*, and public institutions established, by the state and in these not all human beings but only the citizen in each country are equal", she says. This distinction is fundamental. Failure to recognize the difference between the rights in which all human beings and those in which all citizens in a country are equal has in fact often led to violence and terrorism.

The philosophy of human rights has become nowadays a distinct philosophical discipline with a vast literature and hot debates. Professor Kuçuradi's contribution with numerous articles and speeches consists mainly in her personal distinctions between fundamental and not fundamental rights, as aforesaid, in her efforts to link the whole discussion of rights with questions of value, in the justification of rights on the basis of the value of Man as witnessed by the achievements of humanity and mainly in the clarification of many conceptual

confusions that had serious effects on the understanding of the content of each right, on the principles called up for its protection and on the relationship of interests and values. She has also mostly helped the case of rights by pointing out the need for a fully elaborated project for the protection of human rights by all humankind and for all humankind in the belief that, while the protection of rights at the national level is a matter of politics, their protection at the international level is a moral question. Rights are for her both an end in themselves and the basis for every political and social decision. She takes it as the special task of philosophy "to contribute to the globalization of human rights and to call attention on the dignity of Man, through which, all human beings are equal".

It soon became a firm conviction of hers that "a prerequisite for the globalization of human rights is philosophical education", through which people could acquire "an eye able to discern where the dignity of Man is at stake". This conviction soon developed into a need for philosophical education of human rights, and recently teaching of human rights as philosophy courses became a strenuous concern of hers inasmuch as the United Nations have proclaimed 1995-2005 as the "World Decade for the Education of Human Rights". She pays particular attention to the objectives and the way followed in this teaching. On the assumption that the objective of "raising consciousness" is the prospective protection of the individual from the state, the legal viewpoint becomes prevalent in the education of human rights and this leads to the confusion between rights and interests, she remarks. The two other assumed objectives "increasing awareness of the necessity to act to put an end to violations perpetrated in all parts of the world" and "awakening the consciousness of solidarity with those whose rights are violated" mirror an ethical concern, as she puts it. Yet, she does not find them sufficient for a training in human rights intended to extend their protection all over the world and to lead the trainee to acquire the will to act in accordance with human rights as principles of action. She insists that the consciousness of sharing human dignity, i.e. the consciousness of human (not national or cultural) identity, can be acquired through the transmission of the knowledge of the value of certain human potentialities and of the philosophical knowledge of human rights and that it also presupposes the ability to make right evaluation (not value-imputation or value-ascription) of the situations in which one has to fulfil the demands expressed by human rights. Thus, since epistemological knowledge of norms and values is necessary for a proper teaching of human rights, she suggests that their teachers "have to undergo training in philosophy in general and especially in philosophical ethics". She also suggests that philosophical courses on human rights should be offered at all levels of education, that teachers should use the Socratic method and aim at transforming the consciousness of human identity into knowledge by bringing forward examples of human achievements, by pointing out the significance of human rights for the individual and mankind as a whole and by emphasizing the relationship between rights and values as objects of right evaluation.

Professor Kuçuradi has paid particular attention to the teaching of human rights at the university (undergraduate and postgraduate) level in interdisciplinary programs as well as in philosophical research in this field and has elaborated some pilot curricula for pre-university teaching in Turkey. She finds the teaching of human rights necessary to all university and vocational education, but she believes that some professions are more directly connected with the protection of human rights and in these human rights education is a must. She

connects the recent search for common norms with the universality of human rights inasmuch as rights dictate duties on how one should treat the others and dictate respect for what is different. And she stresses again the need for conceptual clarification and epistemological justification of human rights, which constitute basic presuppositions of their effective teaching. Professor Kuçuradi has recently made a great contribution to the elaboration of the "Human Rights Education Programme of Turkey (1998-2007)" as President of the National Committee on the Decade for Human Rights Education. In this programme teaching of human rights is not restricted to primary schools, high schools and universities but extends to law enforcement officers, civil servants, prison superintendents, police, gendarmerie, senior security officers, mass media (press and radio-television), etc. A major role for the protection of human rights has been given to non-governmental organizations. Professor Kuçuradi is director of the "Center for the Research and Application of the Philosophy of Human Rights" and on October 1, 1998 she assumed the UNESCO chair for the Philosophy and Human Rights in an inaugural ceremony held in Ankara.

Congenial to these theses and activities of hers are her "fixed ideas" about the relation of ethics to politics and the fundamental role of philosophy in global politics for the solution of world problems. To the "pseudo-dilemma": abstention of philosophy from the crucial problems in the name of its purity or "degradation" of philosophy to an ancilla of politics she objects the distinction of philosophy as field of knowledge from its end as a human activity; the differentiation between "what is" and "what for" of philosophy. This not only justifies but also prescribes the collaboration of politics with philosophy. "It is the consideration of the end, the goal of philosophy that makes politics ethical" she said in a paper read years ago in Athens. And by "ethical politics" she means "politics that sees as its end the fulfillment and protection of human rights".

Already since 1978 during the Afro-Asian Congress of Philosophy organized in Cairo she had underlined the need of a revolution in international politics, a transformation of it from interstate politics into world politics, into a global policy for human rights, viewing the world "as a whole, consisting not of over one hundred states, but of four billion human beings, living in groups". Only such a revolution at the international level in the name of the protection of human rights would avert rebellions and conflicts aiming to partial interests. In such world politics, she believes, philosophy has the first word and a major role to play to the establishment of a dialogue, better an omnilogue, for a better world order. Human rights are not a political issue only, but primarily an anthropological, moral and axiological problem; they are, as R. Dworkin has argued, the single moral "trumps" of man. Only a philosophical education for human rights would restore the lost human face she never ceased looking for in Nairobi, Seoul, and Cairo and in other international conferences and local symposia she organized, encouraged and inspired.

These ideas and ideals have been served and honored with supererogation and dynamics by Ioanna Kuçuradi through a lifelong dedication to philosophy as theory and praxis both through her numerous writings and her presence in the philosophical world, international and national meetings, in national and international Federations, Councils, Committees and Organisations. This missionary public and global activity did not prevent her to have been a unique University teacher with innumerable notable disciples, now distinguished professors in Turkey and wholeheartedly devotee to her ideals. The academic community of the

University of Crete, of which she became some years ago a honorary doctor, was fascinated by her personality and wisdom.

Still as member of the Steering Committee of the International Federation of Philosophical Societies (F.I.S.P.) she worked hard to broaden and activate the international philosophical community. And as president of various F.I.S.P. Committees she edited considerable volumes on very important issues. As secretary general of F.I.S.P. for a whole decade she did her best to upgrade institutionally the Federation, to organize philosophical communities effectively in all corners of the earth, to establish a tradition for regular philosophical meetings and issued an excellent newsletter, very informative of all philosophical events around the world. The fact that F.I.S.P. became such a vigorous organization and the major philosophical institution globally is due to her to a high degree. This was widely acknowledged and fully appreciated last year in Boston during the XXth World Congress of Philosophy, when Professor Kuçuradi was the first woman to be elected by a large majority president of F.I.S.P. And it is entirely to her credit and the guarantees given to her by the Turkish government that the XXIst World Congress of Philosophy will take place in 2003 in Istanbul. Ioanna Kuçuradi with her lifelong dedication to philosophy, with her wisdom, integrity and goodness, with her charismatic and dynamic personality, and with her untiring efforts to understand and change the world deserves both her election at the highest office entered upon in the international philosophical community and the satisfaction to preside the next world congress in her native town, the meeting point of West and East. We are all very proud of her.