
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HALİL İNALCIK
on his Seventieth Birthday
by his Colleagues and Students

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OTTOMAN NAMES AND OTTOMAN AGES

İ. Metin Kunt
(Cambridge University)

During his long and fruitful career Professor İnalcık has illuminated many different eras of Ottoman history. His earliest work was on nineteenth-century reforms, but then he returned to the very beginnings of Ottoman state and society and worked his way, step by deliberate step, through several Ottoman centuries. Among his many contributions to our field of study one of the most fundamental is his discernment of the stages in the evolution of the state; his periodization is now widely accepted by his colleagues.[1] In paying homage to him, an essay on Ottoman ages through Ottoman eyes might be especially appropriate. The purpose is twofold: to review how some Ottoman intellectuals viewed the empire's progress, and to look at changing fashions in patterns of names used, especially as these changes may have corresponded to perceived eras.

* * *

The Ottoman state was, at one time, among the largest of the world's empires and one of the longest lived. Born around 1300 in the fringes of the Islamic world as a frontier principality in the northwest corner of Anatolia, in the course of the fourteenth century it developed into a sizeable territorial state, the Sultanate of Rum. Its growth was checked after the crushing defeat Bayezid I suffered in the hands of Timur, an Islamic world-conqueror, who relegated the Ottomans to their original role as fighters on the frontier (1402). The regrouped Ottomans had to tread gingerly for a while, especially in their relations with powerful Turko-Persian states established in the centers of the Islamic community. The capture of Constantinople in 1453 gave a new role to Mehmed the Conqueror as reflected in one of his titles: that of Caesar, inheritor of the Roman-Byzantine imperial tradition.

Throughout the next century the Ottomans resumed their expansion in the Balkans and into central Europe, continuing on a grand scale their original calling as Islam's frontier fighters. During the same century, however, the most extensive conquests of the empire were in the original homelands of Islam: Syria and Egypt were conquered in the 1510s, Iraq in the 1530s; conquests followed along the shores of North Africa. This expansion brought mastery over the holy cities of Hijaz and preeminence in the Islamic world. But by the end of the sixteenth century the Ottoman Empire seemed poised to attain an even greater role in history, not only as the outstanding power of the Islamic community but as an empire with world-wide ramifications. Ottoman forces and contingents could be found engaged in struggles in Tyrolean mountains in Austria, the borders of Morocco and Abyssinia, the Indian Ocean, the Caspian Sea and in the Ukraine. The Empire attempted during this time to break open European encroachment and encirclement: Russia in the north, the Spanish Habsburgs in the western Mediterranean, and the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean.

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[1] For a summary of his views see the Introduction, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical age, 1300-1600* (London, 1973). For further elaborations of Ottoman periodization, with different approaches but similar results, see Kemal Karpat, "Stages of Ottoman History" (pp. 79-98), and "Comment" by C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze (pp. 99-105), in Kemal H. Karpat, ed., *The Ottoman Empire and its Place in World History* (Leiden, 1974).

At the end of the century, a combination of domestic problems and a decision to concentrate their efforts on struggles against traditional foes in central Europe and in Iran caused the Ottomans to pull back from the outer frontiers they had attempted to establish. From then on, during a period of growing European power, the state was by and large content to remain behind slowly retracting boundaries. This was also a period of internal reorganization to suit the needs of an increasingly monetized polity. At the end of the seventeenth century Ottoman society sustained a defeat on the Danubian frontier after sixteen years of fighting against a European coalition. This defeat, formalized by the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, was at first viewed by the Ottomans as a temporary setback, severe though it was. Perhaps even more important than the territorial losses suffered at Karlowitz, was the change in Ottoman outlook and mentality: soon the rulers of the empire realized that ground lost to Austria was not to be regained, especially if European powers acted in concert. Thereafter the Ottomans were careful to pursue a peaceful policy abroad; internally, civilian bureaucrats came to dominate the polity instead of the soldier statesmen of previous ages.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century the empire was no longer able to sustain a peace policy in the face of Russian provocations. Following more defeats and greater loss of territory in the north, Ottoman rulers came to believe that European powers were undoubtedly stronger and that a series of institutional changes, especially military and educational, were necessary to catch up with them. Thus the state entered the paradoxical nineteenth century: a period when the Ottomans became the "Eastern Question" for European powers, even dubbed the "sick man of Europe"; yet also a period when the empire was striving to adopt European institutions and hoping to become part of the Concert of Europe, even if as an ailing member. But the old empire had time neither to diagnose the ailment, nor to decide on its proper treatment. Early in the present century, after having witnessed several parts of its body break away in a fever of nationalism, the empire entered a world war which its old body could not sustain and which led to its ultimate dissolution.

* * *

Having reviewed, in summary fashion, the fortunes of the Ottoman Empire through its existence of more than six centuries, we turn now to consider the various ages of the state as they were perceived by Ottomans themselves. These ages do not quite correspond to those recognized by Ottomanists. Nevertheless, in addition to names taken by members of the Ottoman elite or given by them to their children and their retainers, Ottoman views on the evolution of their state and society are properly part of their self-perception, inasmuch as they felt that their history was a fundamental aspect of their identity.

Ottoman intellectuals were heirs to the Islamic tradition, firmly rooted in eastern Mediterranean civilization as further developed by Greeks, Romans, and Persians. In terms of political thought and philosophy of history the immediate mentors of Ottoman writers were relatively recent thinkers such as Nāṣir ad-Dīn Tūsī (d. 1273), Jalāl ad-Dīn Dawwānī (d. 1502), and above all the Maghribi master of historical thought, Ibn Khaldūn (d. 1406).[2] Following him and his intellectual forebears, the Ottomans too conceived of society as an organism, made up of the social equivalents of the four basic elements and the corresponding humors of man, going through a natural life cycle of growth, maturity, and decline.

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[2] However, in a recent article Cornell Fleischer has argued that the historian Muṣṭafā ʿĀlī (d. 1600) had delineated a view of the life span of dynastic states similar to Ibn Khaldūn's but *before* Ottoman intellectuals studied his *Muqaddimah*; Muṣṭafā ʿĀlī's view of history, a shared intellectual heritage, and similar political concerns made it easier for Ottomans to appreciate and embrace Ibn Khaldūn with enthusiasm: "Royal Authority, Dynastic Cyclism, and 'Ibn Khaldunism' in Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Letters," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* (Toronto), vol. 18, nos. 3-4 (1983; special Ibn Khaldūn issue), pp. 198-220.

Analyzing the development of Ottoman polity in the light of political theory was not solely an intellectual endeavor for Ottoman writers of the seventeenth century. The state had recently sustained the turmoil of Celālī revolts and two protracted and costly wars at the turn of the century. During this time of troubles several Ottoman writers considered the problems of the age to come to grips with the situation.[3] Among their writings the succinct treatise of Kātip Çelebī (d. 1657) stands out.[4] He wrote not to catalog the familiar complaints individually but strove to cut to the heart of the matter swiftly. The thrust of his argument was that Ottomans should not despair in the face of their troubles. The empire may have been like an ailing old man but there was no reason, given a wise physician and correct treatment, the old body could not regain at least some of its earlier vigor and continue to enjoy life longer. Demise was inevitable but it could be postponed. Since Kātip Çelebi's purpose was to discuss the ailment, its symptoms, and possible approaches to its treatment, in his brief treatise he does not dwell too long on the ages of the state; he briefly notes that each society goes through the three essential stages of growth, maturity, and decline, and that each age necessitates a different equilibrium and diet.

Writing half a century after Kātip Çelebī, the historian Na'īmā (d. 1716) developed this theme at greater length in the introduction to his famous work.[5] Na'ima incorporates Kātip Çelebī's brief discussion,[6] but then proceeds to a more detailed consideration of the ages of the state, following Ibn Khaldūn.[7] Usually, he notes, a state goes through no more than five stages: emergence; establishment and consolidation; confidence and comfort; quiescence and stasis; dissipation and dissolution. We should note again that both Kātip Çelebī and Na'īmā felt that the Ottoman state was in old age in the seventeenth century; Na'īmā in fact specifies that some time before he was writing the empire had entered the fourth stage of its political life cycle.[8]

* * *

In the following section we shall try to discern the correspondence of changing fashions in Ottoman names to these different periods. In his suggestive and fruitful work involving first names Richard Bulliet has remarked that naming of their children being a rare instance of a relatively free choice for most people, the names they choose may reflect influences upon them.[9] Indeed, names people chose for their children or, in the Ottoman case, sometimes for themselves and their slave-retainers, may yield indications of how they viewed themselves or what aspirations they might have had for the future of their offspring.

When the Ottoman community emerged as an autonomous political unit around the year 1300, it was little more than a band of frontiersmen following a *bey*, their leader, Osman. The majority belonged to the Kayı tribe of Oguz Turks, still practicing their semi-nomadic way of life. The community also included townsmen and peasants, some non-Muslim and non-Turkish. They were all united under their leader, Osman, a fact which was reflected in the name they were known by: *Osmanlı*, or Osman's fol-

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[3] Bernard Lewis, "Ottoman Observers of Ottoman Decline," *Islamic Studies*, vol. 1 (1962), pp. 71-87.

[4] Kātip Çelebi, *Düstūr el-amel li-islāh el-halel* (İstanbul, 1280/1863; written in 1653), pp. 119-139.

[5] Muṣṭafā Na'īmā, *Tārih-i Na'īmā*, 2nd ed. (İstanbul, 1280/1863), Vol. I, Introduction, Section One, pp. 27-44. Na'īmā's ideas in relation to Kātip Çelebī were discussed in Lewis V. Thomas, *A Study of Naima*, Norman Itzkowitz, ed. (New York, 1972).

[6] Na'īmā, I: 27-33.

[7] Na'īmā, I: 33-40.

[8] Na'īmā, I: 59.

[9] "First Names and Political Change in Modern Turkey," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 9 (1978), pp. 489-495.

lowers. They were also united in their common endeavor as frontiersmen. Early Osmanlı community was a miniature citizens' army, almost everybody, perhaps even women, putting aside their daily occupations to take part in raids and skirmishes.

Muslims were predominant in the Osmanlı community; however, its essential character was more Turkish than Muslim. The names of some of the first generation Osmanlıs attest to this Turkishness: Osman himself carried a common Arabic-Muslim name, but his father was Ertuğrul, his uncles were called Sungur Tekin, Gündoğdu, Dündar Alp, his brothers were Savcı Bey and Gündüz Alp, all pre-Islamic Turkish names or titles.[11] This Turkish identity was not simply a phenomenon of an earlier generation: Osman had nephews named Bayhoca, Aktimur and Aydoğdu; among his own sons some carried Arabic-Muslim names (Alaeddin, Melik, Hamid), but others, including his successor Orhan, were named in the Turkish fashion (Pazarlu, Çoban, Savcı). Finally, the Turkish rather than Muslim identity of the early Ottoman community is further indicated by the relative ease with which local Greeks joined Osman's enterprise, presumably speaking Turkish but not necessarily converting to Islam. The most famous such Greek-Ottomans is Mihal Bey, a close associate of Osman, whose sons and grandsons carrying this Greek-Christian family name were among Ottoman leaders for generations to come.

Towards the middle of the fourteenth century, in the time of Orhan Bey, the original Osmanlı community had grown into a principality of some size. In addition to the band of frontiersmen, it now included the urban folk of cities like Bursa and Iznik (Nicea), merchants and artisans. There were also learned men, Muslim scholars *(ulema)* who came to teach in the colleges established in Ottoman lands and to expound the Sharī'a in the courts. It was probably under their influence that the frontier enterprise of the Osmanlı group was cast in an Islamic mold, explained and glorified as a struggle for the faith against the infidels. Thus, when Orhan Bey built a mosque in Bursa in 1337, an Arabic inscription placed there declared him a "hero of state and religion" and a "sultān of ghāzis," fighters of the holy war.[12] Later Ottoman writers, too, beginning with Ahmedi around 1400, glorified the Ottoman ghāzi spirit and their victories over the infidels: a ghāzi, says Ahmedi, is the sword of God and an instrument of the true religion.[13]

Both the mosque inscription of 1337, a public display, and Ahmedi's verse chronicle presented to an Ottoman prince are somewhat in the nature of propaganda; they indicate aspirations rather than reality itself. But at least in this case, the distance between propaganda and self-image seems not to have been vast. Certainly the fact that mosques and madrasas were erected soon after cities were conquered helped to establish the Muslim identity of the Ottoman beys and their followers. Again in Ottoman names we can follow the growth of Islamic sensibility: pre-Islamic Turkish names continued to be used (e.g., Savcı and Yahşı, sons of Murad I) in the fourteenth century, and the names Orhan and Oghuz are encoun-

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[10] Fuad Köprülü, *Osmanlı Devletinin Kuruluşu* (Ankara, 1959): see "bacıyān-i Rūm," pp. 93-94.

[11] For all names and estimates of their popularity I have consulted Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmāni*, 4 vols. (İstanbul, 1308/1890-1316/1899); the first section on the Ottoman dynasty was superbly expanded by Gültekin Oransay, *Osmanoğulları* (Ankara, 1969).

[12] The terms are *shujā' ad-dawla wa'd-dīn* and *sulṭān al-ghuzāt*: Paul Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire* (London, 1938), p. 15 and n.17. For a recent and fresh analysis of the nature of early Ottoman community and the relation of the state with nomads, see Rudi P. Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia* (Bloomington, indiana, 1983); Lindner's comments on the inscription are on pp. 3-8.

[13] Ahmedi, *Dāstān ve Tevārih-i Mülūk-i Āl-i Oşmān*, Çiftçioğlu N. Atsız, ed., in *Osmanlı Tarihleri* (İstanbul, 1949); see p. 17, verse 50-64. For Wittek's comments on Ahmedi, see *Rise*, pp. 11 and 14. Perhaps in religious justification of plunder, Ahmedi says that what the ghazi owned was *ḥalāl*, lawful by sharī'a (verse 24).

tered once in a while even in later centuries, but Arabic-Muslim names came to predominate from the time the frontier activities of the Osmanlı community received an Islamic mantle.

By the end of the fourteenth century Ottoman polity had successfully attained the second stage in the Ibn Khaldūn-Na'īmā analysis of the career of the state. Na'īmā explains that in the first stage of emergence it is a group acting together that establishes its power, and that the leader (like the early Ottoman beys) is little more than a first among equals. But a state is established and power is consolidated only when the leader becomes a ruler: he is differentiated from the group that helped him in the first stage; his position is exalted in the community and, with the help of troops and bureaucrats owing their positions and their loyalty directly to him, he curbs the power of the original leader's companions and their descendants. The joint enterprise based on tribal and group solidarity in the first stage is thus superseded by a state dominated by the ruler and his household.

This analysis of political and administrative differentiation anticipates Max Weber; it is also illustrated by fourteenth-century Ottoman evolution. Indeed, by the end of the century the leader of the Osmanlıs was not simply a bey, a title he shared with many others in the community, but a sultan. Also, he was not a mere sultan of the ghazis in a frontier land, but the sultan of Rum. Rum was what Muslims called the lands of the Byzantine-Roman Empire; Bayezid I (r. 1389-1402) proclaimed by his title his position as the sovereign of a territorial state established in former Byzantine lands. Meanwhile, the social differentiation which had first delineated between a ruling group *(askerī)* and the common citizens *(re'āyā)* to supersede the integrated citizens' army in the time of Osman, had progressed to the point where the sultan's household, both military and bureaucratic, emerged as a counterpoise to the powerful leading families of Ottoman polity. It is appropriate that Sultan Bayezid I, this sovereign ruling over a sizeable territory peopled by adherents of different religions, named his sons Musa (Moses), Ertughrul (the Turkish name of Osman's father), Süleyman (Solomon), İsa (Jesus), as well as Mehmed and Mustafa, perhaps reaching for an ideal of universality.[14]

The fifteenth century, especially during the reign of Mehmed II (1451-1481), marks the passage from consolidation to the third stage, the height of the empire. During this century the Turkish heritage continued to play a dominant role in Ottoman self-perception. Partly to maintain their position in the face of rival Turkoman states in eastern Anatolia and partly to retain the loyalty of their own nomadic subjects, Ottoman rulers emphasized their descent from the legendary sovereign of the Turks, Oghuz Khan, both in genealogies in early Ottoman histories and in diplomatic correspondence.[15] Coins were struck during Murad II's reign (1421-1451) bearing the Kayı tribal sign as part of this Turkish sensibility.[16] Ottoman rulers also started to bear the Turkish title khan in addition to sultan, a practice that was kept up to the end of the empire.

It may appear paradoxical that, during the same century that the Ottoman ruler publicly boasted of his glorious Turkish descent, the Turkoman nomads of his realm were subjected to a steady erosion of their position in Ottoman polity. They had played a prominent role in Osman Bey's frontier enterprise; during the time of his sultanic descendants the Turkoman were reduced to reaya status by means of a steady stream of bureaucratic regulations restricting their movements and placing them under the watchful eyes of Ottoman officers. To the Turkoman so stifled by Ottoman administration it added insult to injury

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[14] This interesting point was made by P. Wittek, "De la defaite d'Ankara à la prise de Constantinople," *Revue des Études Islamiques*, vol. 12 (1938), pp. 1-34.

[15] Wittek, *Rise*, pp. 7-12; Faruk Sümer, *Oğuzlar*, 2nd ed. (Ankara, 1972). See also John E. Woods, *The Aqquyunlu: Clan, Confederation, Empire* (Chicago, 1976), Appendix A, pp. 186-196.

[16] Wittek, *Rise*, p. 11. The sign is visible on coin #67, Plate 6 in Nuri Pere, *Osmanlılarda Madeni Paralar* (İstanbul, 1968).

that the sultan maintained a ceremonial flock of sheep as a memento of his humbler origins even while he listened to court histories glorifying his Oghuz Khanic descent.[17]

For truly the Ottoman sultan ruled over a state, an empire, established on high Islamic traditions, where the Turkish element was only one among several. Especially after the vast conquests of the early sixteenth century the ruling group of the empire saw themselves as the leaders of the Islamic community. Lütfi Paşa, a grand vezir in the time of Süleyman the Magnificent writing in retirement, argued that, though any Islamic ruler who is careful to uphold religious precepts and untiring in his struggle against non-believers might be styled a caliph, the Ottoman sultan deserved to be known as the greatest caliph. This was so not because an obscure Abbasid living in Cairo passed on the caliphate to the Ottoman dynasty after the conquest of Egypt, but because Ottoman sultans reigned over the largest and strongest Islamic realm, were the most successful in fighting the infidels, and ruled their subjects with justice.[18] Reflecting this self-conception, increasingly in the sixteenth century in Ottoman writings the sultan was referred to as the *pādišāh-ı Islām* and Ottoman armies as the *asker-i Islām*. The Ottoman self-image as leaders and protectors of the world of Islam was strengthened by appeals from various Sunni Muslim communities as far afield as the Caspian shores, Sumatra, and North Africa.[19]

Once again it is in personal names used in the Ottoman establishment that we can follow the changes outlined above. When the sultan's household first came to prominence in the polity, towards 1400, the royal slave-servants shared Turkish names such as Timurtaş, Şahin, Doğan, Malkoç, Karaca, Umur, and Saruca with Turkish-born members of Ottoman society. They were also often given Persian names, evoking Iran's pre-Islamic imperial past, such as İskender, Rüstem, Ferhad, Hüsrev, Behram, Firuz, and Siyāvuş. A third category of names, from the Old and New Testaments, including Mesih, Yunus, Yusuf, Yahya, İshak, İlyas, Eyüb, Davud, and İsa, was also very common for retainers, both in the sultan's palace and in other households.

Turkish names soon went out of fashion; Biblical names continued to be used, but with rapidly decreasing frequency after the slowdown of widescale conversion, voluntary or through households. The *Shāhnāme* names, too, became much rarer after the sixteenth century.

During the period Biblical and *Shāhnāme* names were popular for household retainers (and among other members of the military establishment), two trends deserve comment. The first, and quite surprising, observation concerns the most common names throughout Ottoman history. These names, all Arabic-Muslim, are Mehmed, followed in descending order of popularity by Mustafa, Ahmed, Ali, Ibrahim, Hasan, and Hüseyin. Together they account for more than a third of *all* names in the *Sicill-i Oṣmānī*, the main Ottoman biographical dictionary. The astonishing thing is that, until well into the fifteenth century, these extremely popular names were almost never used for slave-servants. The other side of the coin is that the names common for the household retainers, especially those of Persian origin, were extremely rare among Ottomans prominent in the religious/learned profession. The explanation that immediately comes to mind is that these two groups within the Ottoman establishment, the religious and the military, tended to be totally apart until about 1450 when popular Muslim names came very gradually to be used for Christian-born retainers too, in addition to Persian and Biblical names. Thereafter the dichotomy between the groups continued, but gradually the gap grew closer. We can also surmise that during this time the rulers and their military lieutenants perceived the main heritage of the empire to be Persian and pre-Islamic.

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[17] Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans*, p. 2; but this is really the major theme of Lindner's book.

[18] H. A. R. Gibb, "Lütfi Paşa on the Ottoman Caliphate," *Oriens*, vol. 15 (1962), pp. 287-295.

[19] For examples of claims of Islamic leadership in official reports of Ottoman victories see G. L. Lewis, "The Utility of Ottoman Fethnāmes," in *Historians of the Middle East*, Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt, eds. (London, 1962), pp. 192-196.

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A further illustration of the dichotomy between the *ulema* and the *ümera*, the men of religion and learning vs. the military commanders, is supplied by the use of the name Abdullah which is a special case. As is well known, Abdullah was used as the fictive name of a convert's father.[20] One consequence of this usage is that in a milieu where converts abounded, as in the military establishment or in an area experiencing large-scale voluntary conversion, Abdullah was hardly ever used as a real first name, certainly not until 1500. Among the *ulema*, however, Abdullah was obviously a perfectly common first name since it was hardly ever used as a fictitious patronymic.

A major shift in name patterns can be discerned around 1600. From then on names of Biblical or Persian origin, hitherto extremely common among the military, were used but rarely. In fact, from this time on the previous distinctions between the *ulema* and the *ümera* with regard to naming patterns all but vanished. The earlier military names were replaced by fancier Arabic-Muslim names which were once used almost exclusively in *ulema* familites. Ebussuud, Ebubekir, Esad, and Emin are examples of such names which became much more widespread in the Ottoman world through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the Ottoman dynasty, too, compound Arabic names like Abdülmecid and Abdülmelik first appeared in the early eighteenth century and they became so popular that most sultans in the last Ottoman century carried such names.

It is true that the *devshirme* practice of recruiting non-Muslim boys within the empire for palace service was abandoned around 1600. But this cannot be the explanation of the "Islamization," so to speak, of the military establishment in their names, for the custom of training household slaves/retainers (from sources other than *devshirme*) for state and military service continued. The disappearance of marked differences in names used in the learned and military professions was in fact an indication of the growing "Islamization" of the polity in its outlook and practices.[21] To be sure the increasing similarity in names for these different groups does not at all imply a blurring of functional distinctions. On the contrary, functional diversification in Ottoman administration continued steadily even while a shared Ottoman-Islamic ethos developed to encompass the different branches of the polity. As the empire was increasingly feeling the debilitation of old age, according to Kātip Çelebi, and languishing in complacent, quiescent stagnation according to Na'īmā, the self-image of Ottoman rulers and of the ruling group slowly shifted. Ottomans saw themselves less as the inheritors of west Asian imperial traditions with a strong element of Iranian political heritage, and more as the leaders of the community of Islam.

* * *

A totally new fashion in Ottoman names emerged in the eighteenth century, a fashion of two interrelated aspects. In the first place, one is struck by a plethora of newly-coined names never before seen in such profusion in earlier periods. There were so many new names that it would be impossible to list them all. Some examples may suffice: Tevfik, Pertev, Servet, and Hikmet are among the new eighteenth-century names which remained in popular use to this day. Many of these newly-coined or revived names were in the Arabic active participle, *fā'il*, or the adjectival, *fa'īl*, patterns; Cāvid, Hāmid, Rā'if, Rāġıb and Reşīd, Sa'īd, Zekī are some examples. As such, they were similar to the *mahlas*, the pen name assumed by poets and writers. As many Ottoman bureaucrats had literary preoccupations or pretensions, it was quite common for any aspiring scribe to assume a pen name early in his career. Quite clearly, then, this new fashion in names is to be associated with the rise of the bureaucrats to challenge

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[20] V. L. Ménage has pointed out exceptions to this usage where the father's real name was retained: "On the Ottoman Word Aḫriyān/Aḫiryān," *Archivum Ottomanicum*, vol. I (1969), p. 209, n.37.

[21] For further discussion of this process see İ. Metin Kunt, "Transformation of *Zimmi* into *Askeri*" in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, eds., *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire* (New York, 1982), Vol. I, pp. 55-67.

and appropriate the power and position of the military administrators. Judging by the widespread use of bureaucratic names, their rise to power was so complete that others in the polity were quite overcome by this new order, and submitted to it by naming their children in the new fashion.

The second new element in eighteenth-century names was the use of double names, such as İsmail Hakkı, Mehmed Emin, Mahmud Ekrem, and Mustafa Reşid. This again was a bureaucratic practice, not too widely observed earlier, of keeping the original name in addition to the pen name, as in the cases of the bureaucrat-historians Muṣṭafa 'Ālī and Muṣṭafā Na'īmā. The use of double names became much more widespread in the nineteenth century when it was rare to meet an Ottoman statesman or author with only a single personal name. It might therefore appear at first sight that the fashion of double names was associated with the movement of westernization started by Mahmud II after 1826 and continued to the end of the empire. But in fact the practice had started a century earlier when there was no hint of westernization in Ottoman society; it was merely another aspect of the civilianization of the polity with the ascendancy of the scribes.

Na'īmā himself died in the early part of the eighteenth century when, in his view, the fourth stage of the empire's life cycle was already a century old. He must have thought that the fifth and last stage, the dissolution of the state, was imminent. Yet the new balance of the eighteenth century, both external and internal, continued undisturbed until the Russian War of 1768-1774. With westernization after that, in fact the old empire was partly rejuvenated to the extent that it was able to reestablish central control over some far-flung corners of the realm. When dissolution finally came with the Great War of 1914-1918, what had sapped the empire's life was nationalism among its peoples. The old multi-religious, multi-ethnic society had become anachronistic in the modern age of nationalism. Neither Na'īmā nor any other pre-modern Ottoman intellectual could have foreseen such an end. The famous nineteenth-century statesman-historian Ahmed Cevdet Paşa (d. 1895), a follower of Ibn Khaldūn, Kātip Çelebī, and Na'īmā in terms of the organic view of the state, was of course aware of the processes undermining the integrity of the empire. Even to him, however, and at such a late date, it seemed that it was the non-Muslims only who wanted to break away to form their own nation-states. The full force of nationalism which does not recognize religious ties had eluded even such an astute observer as Cevdet Paşa.[22]

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It only remains for us to record a final change in names, although it came after the empire's end, and is of a different nature. With full-scale westernization under Kemal Atatürk's republic, citizens of Turkey were required by law in 1935 to adopt family names. Our theme has been personal names; the adoption of European-style surnames does not, therefore, fit in with our discussion. Yet it is appropriate to end on this note, when the shape of the name became once again an integral element of cultural passage.

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[22] Ümid Meriç, *Cevdet Paşa'nın Cemiyet ve Devlet Görüşü* (İstanbul, 1975), pp. 29-40.